Ambassador
G. R. Baluch
Pakistan has a basis for this role. It helped broker the June MOU and has kept channels open to Tehran and Washington, working with Qatar and other interlocutors. In October, army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir travelled to Tehran for renewed mediation and met Iranian leaders; the visit sustained engagement but produced no breakthrough. Pakistan’s border with Iran, security ties with Saudi Arabia and access to Western capitals give Islamabad a distinctive position. It should turn that access into a concrete initiative.
Istanbul should establish an R4+E3 contact group to revive the MOU within a fixed period. Pakistan could present a revised text separately to Iran and the United States, then seek backing from the other six states. Türkiye can convene; Egypt and Saudi Arabia can bring Arab and Gulf perspectives; the E3 can shape nuclear and verification provisions. Oman and Qatar should join as facilitators with useful channels and direct maritime interests. The group must consult, not speak for, the parties.
An updated MOU should preserve the original’s practical achievements while correcting its weaknesses. First, it should define an immediate reciprocal stand-down: the United States, Iran and Israel would halt attacks on one another and on civilian, energy and nuclear facilities, and refrain from actions that threaten commercial shipping. It must be reciprocal and verifiable. Israel was not a signatory to the June agreement, so the R4+E3 cannot simply extend that bilateral instrument to bind it. Separate, parallel commitments or assurances would be needed to bring Israel into a de-escalation track. Any ceasefire must name the parties and provide a channel to address alleged violations.
Second, the MOU should make safe passage through Hormuz an early, visible confidence-building measure and reaffirm freedom of navigation through Bab al-Mandab. The original framework contemplated Iranian efforts to ensure safe passage, demining and dialogue with Oman and Gulf states, but disagreement over who would control or regulate Hormuz proved consequential. An updated text should avoid ambiguous claims of exclusive control. It could establish a temporary maritime safety mechanism with Iran, Oman and Gulf littoral states, supported by neutral technical monitoring, direct naval communication and advance notice of exercises. The aim is to restore traffic and prevent miscalculation, not provoke a military confrontation around convoys. Bab al-Mandab requires its own regional understandings and protection from attacks by any party.
Third, the nuclear track should begin promptly and proceed alongside, rather than after, maritime and security steps. Iran’s nuclear issue must be resolved through negotiation, safeguards and verification, not war. Iran should restore full cooperation with the IAEA, provide the necessary access and accounting, and negotiate limits that give credible assurances against weaponisation. In parallel, the United States and other parties should set out a clear, phased path for easing sanctions and economic restrictions as verified steps are completed. The original MOU left the handling of enriched material and some questions about enrichment to a final agreement. The revived text should specify a timetable, benchmarks and a dispute-resolution process so that neither side can indefinitely delay the core bargain.
A fourth element must be monitoring. The June framework envisaged an executive mechanism, but the parties need a clear process for checking compliance, responding to incidents and resolving disputes before they trigger renewed strikes. The R4+E3 contact group could convene an implementation cell with designated national representatives, while the IAEA would remain the authority for nuclear verification. A hotline could help distinguish attacks from accidents or misattribution. A renewed MOU should be time-bound, reported against specific benchmarks, and open to endorsement by the United Nations Security Council once a comprehensive agreement is reached. Outside powers can facilitate and verify; only the parties can make the necessary commitments.
The group’s public message should reject war as a means of settling the nuclear dispute or serving any leader’s domestic political calculations. This is particularly important when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has argued for eliminating Iran’s capacity and when military escalation is presented as an alternative to negotiation. This does not excuse Tehran or minimise the danger of a nuclear-armed Iran. Iran must meet its safeguards obligations and accept credible verification. But no leader’s political survival can justify exposing the Gulf, Israel, Iran and the wider region to a catastrophic war. A durable settlement requires reciprocal restraint, not a
blank cheque to any belligerent.
The obstacles are formidable. Trust has eroded; the June arrangement collapsed before its hardest provisions were resolved; Tehran and Washington disagree on the order of issues; and Israel is outside the original MOU. The three principal belligerents are not all represented at the Istanbul table. The R4’s support for Saudi security may be read in Tehran as alignment against Iran, while the E3’s association with Western sanctions may limit its credibility. Their priorities on Palestine, Yemen and Ukraine also differ, and they cannot settle conflicts for absent parties. The initiative will only be credible if it is open to Iran, Israel and other affected states, and if the sponsors apply the same standard of restraint to all.
At a minimum, ministers should call for an immediate halt to escalation, protection of civilians and safe navigation through Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. A stronger result would launch the contact group, appoint envoys and ask Pakistan to circulate a revised MOU within days. Consultations with Washington, Tehran and Tel Aviv could follow, then talks with the parties and regional facilitators. The group should also support humanitarian access and political solutions for Palestine, Yemen and Syria. A statement alone will not avert war; a dated process might.
Pakistan should therefore make revival of the Islamabad Peace MOU the central thesis of its diplomacy through the R4+E3. The initiative would connect the grouping’s regional relationships with the E3’s nuclear negotiating experience and give the meeting a concrete first task: stop attacks, reopen the straits and return the Iran nuclear question to a verifiable diplomatic track. It is not a finished solution or a way for outside states to decide the region’s future, but a bridge back to talks that addresses the concerns of Iran, Israel, Gulf states and the United States.
A beacon of peace is not created by the number of flags around a table. It appears when states use their influence to keep vital sea lanes open, protect civilians, reduce the risk of miscalculation and bring adversaries back to negotiations. The R4+E3 cannot by itself deliver peace in Gaza, Yemen, the Gulf or Ukraine. It can, however, make a serious effort to avert the most devastating war now threatened: revive the Islamabad MOU, improve it where it failed, and secure parallel commitments from all the belligerents. If Pakistan presses that proposal with the other six states, Istanbul could mark the beginning of a peace initiative rather than another round of declarations.
The writer is a former ambassador and Director Global and Regional Studies Center at IOBM University Karachi.
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