US President Donald Trump’s call to “take back” Bagram Airbase has thrust Afghanistan back into the centre of global debate. Abandoned in 2021 during Washington’s chaotic withdrawal, the base is more than military infrastructure. It symbolises the cycle of foreign intrusion and retreat that has defined Afghan history, from the Soviet exit in 1989 to the collapse of the US project three decades later. The Taliban’s response was predictable, invoking sovereignty to reject any return of foreign forces. Their fiery declarations, however, conceal an uncomfortable truth. They have yet to meet the most basic obligation of statehood pledged in Doha: preventing Afghan soil from being used for violence beyond its borders. Pakistan has endured more than 700 cross-border attacks claimed by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in the past two years, costing over 1,000 civilian and security lives. Far from restoring order, the Taliban regime has presided over a security vacuum that destabilises the entire region and exposes neighbouring states to a renewed wave of terror. Bagram’s value to Washington is not confined to counterterrorism. Its location places it within striking range of militant sanctuaries and China’s western frontier, making it a tempting asset in an age of great-power rivalry. Any American return, however, would demand major deployments, risk reigniting insurgency, and appear to Afghans as reoccupation rather than security provision. The calculus is therefore not only military but political: how much appetite exists in Washington to bear the costs of a second Afghan foray, and how much resistance can be expected from Kabul’s current rulers. For Pakistan, the stakes are heavier than most. Since 2001, more than 80,000 Pakistanis have perished in terror attacks, while the economy has absorbed losses exceeding $150 billion. Refugee inflows–currently at 3.7 million Afghans, both documented and undocumented–have stretched health, education and labour markets for generations. Each Afghan implosion, whether in 1989, 1996, 2001 or 2021, has extracted its cost in Pakistani lives and livelihoods, underlining how every shift in Afghanistan’s trajectory reverberates across our borders. Compounding this is the Taliban’s abject failure to govern. They have banned girls from secondary schools and universities, gutted the civil service, and presided over an economy where over 90 per cent of Afghans now live below the poverty line. Such a collapse ensures that militancy finds fertile ground and refugee outflows intensify. From Islamabad’s vantage point, this translates directly into more terrorism, more displacement and deeper economic strain. History must not be allowed to repeat itself. The Soviet retreat birthed civil war. The Taliban’s first rule created a haven for global jihad. The American intervention unleashed two decades of conflict. At every turn, Pakistan has carried burdens imposed by decisions made elsewhere. This time, Islamabad’s stance must be unambiguous. It must press the Taliban to dismantle cross-border sanctuaries, engage with Washington and Beijing to prioritise counterterrorism over adventurism, and demand recognition at every forum as the principal victim of Afghan instability. Anything less would be a surrender to the chequered past, and a disaster the country cannot afford.
