Atif Mehmood<\/p>\n
In the world we have today, Europe rearming is something it used to run from: rearming. Geopolitics can no longer be a high ideal or ab\u00adstraction among diplomats and think tanks. It is now an im\u00adpelling, inevitable force that defines budgets, economies, identities, and decisions. Following years when secu\u00adrity was considered second\u00adary or discretionary, defence now stands at the forefront.
\nFigures speak for themselves. In 2024, military spending in Europe in\u00adcreased by 17 per cent, amounting to some 693 billion dollars, with Europe becoming the prime driver of world\u00adwide spikes in defence expenditure. The increase was a record one. Al\u00admost all European nations increased their defence spending in the year, apart from one tiny republic. Military spending now stands at its highest since the Cold War ended. In the Euro\u00adpean Union alone, military spending in 2024 reached some 343 billion euros, around 1.9 per cent of GDP. Estimates suggest it should grow to 381 billion in 2025. In the span of only three years, the republics of the European Union have increased defence spending by more than 30 per cent in real terms.
\nThis rearmament is in no way uni\u00adform or unequivocal. States close to Russia or other hot spots have been raising spending the most vigorous\u00adly. Poland ranks among the most am\u00adbitious. It increased defence expendi\u00adture from 2.7 per cent of GDP in 2022 to more than 4.2 per cent in 2024, tar\u00adgeting 4.7 per cent in 2025. Germany, supported by a special defence fund, increased its military budget by more than 28 per cent in 2024 and is spear\u00adheading the Western European effort. States in southern Europe are more circumspect. Spain, for instance, fac\u00ades political demands that it should fo\u00adcus spending socially and not increase military expenditure. The result shows how strategic urgency and appetites are far apart at the continental level.
\nThe largest adjustment occurred in mid-2025, when the members of NATO agreed on a new goal: 5 per cent of GDP for defence and security by 2035. That includes 3.5 per cent for core mil\u00aditary capabilities such as troops, equip\u00adment, and readiness, and an extra 1.5 per cent for infrastructure, cyber de\u00adfence, and military mobility. Most ana\u00adlysts doubt the goal\u2019s economic or po\u00adlitical feasibility, at least for smaller economies. Nevertheless, the message runs clearly: Europe is shifting from to\u00adken increases to structural reform.
\nThe rationale for this goes beyond economics. The all-out invasion of Ukraine by Russia shattered the delu\u00adsion that Europe could count indefi\u00adnitely on geography, diplomacy, or the firepower of America. Security dan\u00adgers are increasing not only along the periphery but also in the realms of supply lines, energy, cyberspace, and key technological domains. The oft-held hypothesis that the United States will indefinitely subsidise European defence is losing steam. In Brussels, Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw, the specu\u00adlation is now all about credible deter\u00adrence and strategic autonomy.
\nBut more funds do not necessari\u00adly add up to more security. Capabil\u00adity does. Many in Europe are order\u00ading large numbers of drones, missile defences, fighter aircraft, and ships. Denmark ordered a new batch of up to 16 F-35s. Germany invested 10 bil\u00adlion dollars in the building of drones. But hardware is only one element of readiness. Resilience, logistics, mobil\u00adity, and defence industry capacity also need to catch up. Shortfalls in stock\u00adpiles, maintenance, and interoperabil\u00adity still undercut deterrence.
\nThe increased expenditure is also generating political tension. Balancing military priorities with welfare obliga\u00adtions is no easy task. In some nations, defence spending will catch up with expenditure on education or health\u00adcare. That will sit uneasily with elec\u00adtorates already strained by inflation, prices, and stagnant incomes. If the re\u00adarmament effort is perceived as dam\u00adaging living standards, the consen\u00adsus base will shrink. Openness and accountability are essential.
\nMeanwhile, defence policy is defin\u00ading the contours of Europe\u2019s personal\u00adity. The debate is no longer merely how much to spend, but whether to spend. Should Europe aspire to global power projection or focus on regional defence and deterrence? How should it balance emerging threats such as cyberwarfare and robotics? In which domains should it focus? Strategic questions once de\u00adbated in the shadows are gaining clar\u00adity and prominence.
\nPublic awareness and consent are necessary. Rearmament cannot work if people are confused about its aim. Gov\u00adernments have to be transparent about the threats Europe faces and how spending more on defence enhanc\u00ades security. It is not about reverting to Cold War mentality. It is about develop\u00ading plausible, new deterrence in an age in which military, economic, and online strength are inextricably combined.
\nThere are several things Europe needs to do to make this turnaround reinforce rather than destabilise the continent. First, expenditure needs to be phased and graduated. Jumping suddenly will cause shocks and political backlash. In\u00adcremental targets linked with quantifi\u00adable capability enhancements will be more sustainable and defensible.
\nSecond, coordination must take pri\u00adority. Countries must align procure\u00adment pipelines, research establish\u00adments, and defence infrastructure. Cooperative programmes diminish du\u00adplication and foster confidence.
\nThird, civilian priorities should be pre\u00adserved. Social programmes should not be deflated by defence budgets. There is a need to balance the budget approach to consider both security and social co\u00adhesion. Fourth, security needs to be de\u00adfined broadly. It covers the realms of cy\u00adber defence, energy resilience, disaster preparedness, and key infrastructure.
\nFifth, agencies should track and assess progress. Separate oversight, parliamen\u00adtary scrutiny, and popular participation can help ensure spending delivers out\u00adcomes, not leakages or corruption.
\nEurope\u2019s rearmament is no longer moot; it is a reality. The open issue is whether it is strategic or reactive, co\u00adherent or ad hoc, democratic or closed. Done well, it can lay the groundwork for the continent\u2019s long-term stabil\u00adity and strength. Done badly, it can foster resentment, inefficiency, and unforeseen outcomes.
\nThe stakes are high. A secure Europe is more than a military goal; it is a so\u00adcial and political imperative. In an era in which threats are hybrid, alliances are fluid, and public faith is tenuous, the method Europe chooses to con\u00adstruct its defence stance will deter\u00admine more than its preparedness. It will determine its future.<\/p>\n
The writer works in search & advertising at Microsoft Ireland, with a master\u2019s degree in business and computer science. The author can be reached at atif@live.ie.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Atif Mehmood In the world we have today, Europe rearming is something it used to run from: rearming. Geopolitics can no longer be a high ideal or ab\u00adstraction among diplomats and think tanks. It is now an im\u00adpelling, inevitable force that defines budgets, economies, identities, and decisions. Following years when secu\u00adrity was considered second\u00adary or […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[13484],"class_list":{"0":"post-509762","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-article","7":"tag-atif-mehmood"},"yoast_head":"\n