Saba Abbasi
\nThe concept of deterrence is being tested in these times. Among other factors, the intricacies of alliance politics add nuance and complexity to deterrence paradigms, particularly extended deterrence. Recently, the idea and execution of extended deterrence were practically put on trial after Israel\u2019s attack on Qatar. This raised a question: can a concept that appeared so promising and benevolent in post-Cold War literature truly live up to its definition?
\nExtended deterrence involves discouraging attacks on third parties, such as allies or partners, by a hegemon providing a security umbrella. For obvious reasons, extended deterrence is more challenging than direct deterrence, as it demands the projection of military force, sometimes thousands of miles away. In this case, Qatar already hosts America\u2019s largest air base\u2013Al Udeid. Moreover, extended deterrence often includes stationing significant numbers of troops from the deterring state on ally\u2019s territory, another condition already met, since the US has a large number of troops on Qatari soil.
\nThe fulfilment of these key conditions of extended deterrence, and yet Israel attacking Qatar and violating its sovereignty, indicates that more factors determine its success or failure. It shows that extended deterrence relies not only on capability but also on political will. The US did not retaliate or punish Israel, suggesting limits to its commitment. The limits stemmed not from lack of capability but from lack of political will. For a hegemon, extending security often means one ally is prioritised over another. In this case, the US\u2019s more important ally is Israel. Although Trump discouraged and distanced himself from Israel\u2019s actions, he still made a concession by calling Israel\u2019s target (Hamas) \u201cworthy.\u201d
\nHad Israel succeeded in its attack and killed all Hamas representatives in its strike on a Qatari residential complex, the US might also have forgone even the mild rebuke it extended after the airstrike. This highlights the selective application of deterrence, implying that extended deterrence may be effective against adversaries but not necessarily against hegemon\u2019s own allies. It also creates ambiguity for allies under the security umbrella. In this case, the threat to Qatar did not come from Iran or non-state groups but from within the US alliance system.
\nNaturally, for Qatar and other US allies, reassurance was shaken. The security umbrella began to appear less about territorial protection and more about US operational convenience. It also meant that within alliance networks, smaller partners are more exposed to harm from larger allies, as the US prioritises its hierarchy of relationships.
\nThe Ukraine-Russia war is another instance of failed extended deterrence. Under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Russia, the US, and the UK pledged to respect Ukraine\u2019s independence, sovereignty, and borders. They also promised \u201cto refrain from the threat or use of force\u201d against Ukraine. In return, Ukraine gave up the nuclear weapons (and its deterrence) it had inherited from the Soviet Union and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state. Ukrainian President Zelensky\u2019s statement last year\u2014\u201cNot a single day did this document work\u201d reveals that effective guarantees, real alliances, and a realistic security foundation require readiness to confront. No wonder, deterrence collapsed in 2022. Instead of preventing war, assurances shifted into damage control through aid, sanctions, and further security commitments.
\nSimilarly, the United States also asserts that it will ensure robust, ready, and credible deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. However, analysts note that President Donald Trump\u2019s \u201cAmerica First\u201d approach could weaken America\u2019s security commitment in the region. Although US reaffirmations serve as an extended deterrence signal meant to discourage Beijing from considering force, only time will tell how the US\u2019s extended deterrence will play out when push comes to shove.
\nDuring the Cold War, there were constant debates about the credibility of the US promise to \u201csacrifice New York for Paris.\u201d These debates are relevant again today in the context of ongoing geopolitical circumstances, raising the question of whether global powers like the US would actually commit to an automatic response if vital national interests are not at stake. Historically, the most famous cases of extended deterrence failure involving the US were the Korean War in 1950 and Kuwait\u2019s invasion in 1990. Its failure can be partly traced to the US\u2019 unwillingness to demonstrate the automaticity of response seen in direct deterrence, which seeks to prevent attacks on one\u2019s own territory. Moreover, the United States\u2019 tacit approval of Kuwait\u2019s invasion, coupled with its inability to reconcile defense commitments with broader strategic alliances, also highlights the limitations of its extended deterrence posture. Taken together, these examples underscore a recurring pattern. In most cases, if not all, direct deterrence will take precedence over extended deterrence. States ultimately look after their own strategic interests, and external assurances often remain rhetorical. Deterrence, thus, remains a function of self-help.<\/p>\n
The writer is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS), Islamabad, Pakistan. She can be reached at cass.thinkers@casstt.com<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Saba Abbasi The concept of deterrence is being tested in these times. Among other factors, the intricacies of alliance politics add nuance and complexity to deterrence paradigms, particularly extended deterrence. Recently, the idea and execution of extended deterrence were practically put on trial after Israel\u2019s attack on Qatar. This raised a question: can a concept […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":511488,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[10,4],"tags":[13614],"class_list":{"0":"post-511478","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-article","8":"category-national","9":"tag-saba-abbasi"},"yoast_head":"\n