Attending Balochistan Politically

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Dr Qaisar Rashid

Years ago, the Centre used to appease Balochistan by extending offers such as the Aghaz-e Haqooq-e Balochistan package of 2009 – to be implemented in three years. This is no longer the case. The Centre is now least interested in looking into the grievances of the Baloch.
The mere approval of the Balochistan package unanimously (on November 23, 2009) by Parliament indicated two points. First, Balochistan was deprived of the requisite attention. Second, the Centre admitted that the province was harboring grievances, needed to be redressed. When the 18th Constitutional Amendment of 2010 offered the much sought-after provincial autonomy to the provinces, including Balochistan, it was thought that the Centre-province rift would subside in the favour of the Baloch. By March 2011, the Centre could implement 15 of the 61 proposals enshrined in the reforms package. Afterwards, the Centre lost the plot and could not implement the Balochistan in toto. The province was left to its own devices. One reason could be that the Centre became a hotbed of political wrangling, especially from 2013 to 2017, culminating in the ouster of Mian Nawaz Sharif. Precisely, the post-2014 era exacerbated the alienation of Balochistan, which questions the legitimacy of political representation despite enjoying provincial autonomy. Development at the cost of rigged elections and political engineering is a paradox haunting the province.
The rationale behind the Balochistan package of 2009 and the Constitutional Amendment of 2010 was to deal with the province politically. Both had together recognized that the Balochistan crisis was a political one – to be dealt with political measures – to lessen the sense of alienation of the Baloch and to make them join the politico-economic mainstream. However, after 2017, events spiraled out of control. The attention of the Centre strayed away from the province. Resultantly, discontent grew further in the province leading to a low-intensity insurgency and frequent military actions.
In the past, even the Supreme Court tried to pay heed to the Baloch grievances especially related to enforced disappearances. This is no more the case. As the Chief Judge, Justice Qazi Faiz Isa kept himself isolated from the issues wrecking Balochistan. His self-imposed inaction harmed the Baloch cause, adding more to the estrangement and helplessness of the Baloch. Despite representing Balochistan, he refused to lend any hand of help to the Baloch.
Pakistan has no evaluating system in place to fathom what percentage of people in Balochistan sides with the Baloch militants and what fraction sides with the installed provincial government. Similarly, no survey has been conducted to understand the grievances of the Baloch youth. Frequent news of disappearance of them from various universities are reported in the media. There is no mechanism to know how many are recovered and how many remain unaccounted for. The attack on the Jaffar Express has reminded of the complexity of the crisis ravaging Balochistan. The reason of intelligence failure might not be that the intelligence infrastructure was not in position but that intelligence gathering could not be made possible. The disconnect present between the streets and the intelligence operatives took a toll on the lives of passengers. The disconnect is not unique to the train tragedy. Instead, the disconnect is visible in every episode of militancy taking on the convoy of the security forces across Balochistan.
The army top brass thinks that launching military operations in both northwest and southwest is imperative to elicit the hard-state status. This thought is in sharp contrast to the principle of solving issues with political means. A military operation can suppress a voice of disgruntlement but it cannot bring about permanent peace and tranquility. Each operation adds a bitter memory to the minds of the locals, alienating the next generation. What is unique with the ongoing militancy in Balochistan is that the educated Baloch youth including females are part of it. This is an expression of desperation, and in no way merits a military operation. In a society, which is overwhelmingly tribal in nature, the exclusion of tribal heads and the inclusion of the educated Baloch youth speaks volumes about the extent and depth of dissatisfaction.
This is a naïve idea to draw a parallel between missing persons in the United States (US) or the United Kingdom (UK) with missing persons in Balochistan. Either in the US and UK, the state does not make its citizens disappear to spend their lives in dungeons. In these developed countries, the youth opt for adventurism which cost them their lives. However, in Balochistan, the issue of missing persons is accompanied with enforced disappearances and mutilated dead bodies.
Besides the ownership of the province, another fundamental grievance of the Baloch is that they are being dispossessed of the ownership of natural and mineral wealth. The Baloch consider that their province is being exploited to the advantage of the Centre. It is known that many of the Baloch grievances stem from the lack of interaction with other ethnic members of the federation. Isolation breeds alienation and distrust. Nevertheless, the Baloch think that the Centre interferes with the affairs of their province through the army which runs military operations and which does political engineering to prop up politicians of its choice.
The Centre must be mindful of the fact that the launching of any military operation would exacerbate unrest in Balochistan. Whether or not there is involved any foreign hand, the local disquiet must be addressed by means other than coercive ones. Instead of resorting to a knee-jerk reaction, a prudent strategy is to give political dialogue a chance to deliver its dividends.

The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com