Ikram Sehgal
One of the lasting lessons of World War II was that modern warfare can only be waged by an integrated defence command. Germany’s early success in the war was due to a centralised decision-making rather than a combined command structure. While the German Navy performed admirably thereafter in pursuing the war aims by making the Atlantic dangerous for crossings and thus strangulating Britain materially, the Luftwaffe frittered away its resources in a decisive swing away from its prime mission of destroying Britain’s air machine to the more horrific (and psychological) method of attacking civilian targets and demoralising the population, particularly London. Even while Churchill mourned the loss of lives and property of Londoners, he breathed a sigh of relief that the Royal Air Force, brought to its knees, was being spared to fight another day. In contrast, by the end of the war, the Allies had a totally integrated defence command structure, symbolised on the Western Front by General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander of all Allied Forces (or Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) as it was known). In the eastern sector, despite his differences with the US Navy, which had been given paramount power for warfare in the Pacific, once naval superiority had been achieved, General Douglas MacArthur was the ‘Czar’ of all military operations being conducted to defeat Japan.
Korea, Vietnam, the Falkland Islands and, more recently, the Gulf War are all examples of the dire necessity of a co-ordinated command structure. Pakistan seems to have half-learnt these lessons more in theory rather than actual practice. During the ’70s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) was created, incidentally more for political reasons to cut down the Army Commander’s nuisance value as C-in-C than any great belief in military philosophy. Today, it remains an ineffective instrument of use, an impotent white elephant that has all the ingredients for performing admirably except the authority to do so. All three Services have developed better knowledge of each other over the years, but the co-ordination and cohesiveness necessary for conducting modern wars is lacking.
There is a pressing need for joint efforts by the armed forces to address the escalating challenges of terrorism within Pakistan and along its borders and to develop a strategy for countering hybrid warfare. Standardising arms and equipment across all three Services is essential, while minimising administrative duplication is equally crucial. Establishing a centralised superior headquarters to oversee all three Services, both in peacetime and during wartime, is a logical step.
Despite the vital role of the Navy in protecting our sea frontier and the Air Force in keeping control over our airspace, any external war will primarily be a land war. As such, it is the Army General, like in NATO, who is the Ground Forces Commander and who must have absolute control over the Armed Forces of the country. He is the person who must call the shots, not only in wartime but also in peacetime, to ensure that during times of crisis the three Services are co-ordinated towards a single mission: the defence of Pakistan. The mission dictates the deployment of forces; while it is true that cost dictates the size of the forces, particularly high-cost ones like the Air Force and the Navy, the overall concept of threat perception in Pakistan is to have adequate land forces to counter possible enemy threat on the ground on different axes. Neither the Air Force Chief nor the Naval Chief would have the inherent professional knowledge of land conditions equivalent to that of a Corps Commander; as such, it would be a luxury, just because of their feelings, to rotate the hat of the Chairman JCSC among them. One feels that the survival of the country is more important than anyone’s feelings. If we were to accept such a theory, then why not have doctors, aeronautical engineers, electrical and mechanical engineers, as well as Control and Reporting personnel from the PAF, engineers in naval vessels, etc. all lining up to become Chiefs in their respective Services? In the Army, the COAS can only be from one of the fighting arms: Armour, Infantry, Artillery and Engineers (which must be counted as a fighting arm). We should be very clear about the issue: the Chairman JCSC should be from the Army.
As far back as 5 March 1991, in an article in The Nation entitled “The Gulf Crisis, Some Lessons Some Opportunities”, I wrote, quote, “We may have paralysed our own command and control mechanism by inadequacies in our present organisational structure. Although lip service is given to unified command by having a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), it is common knowledge that he is a figurehead of an ineffective body whose only claim to fame is protocol duties and preparation of position papers of various kinds, the routine job of a think tank. How toothless a tiger the Chairman JCSC is was shown to good effect by the late Gen Zia who as COAS was nominally junior to the Chairman JCSC, General Sharif, when he took over power as Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1977” unquote. COAS’ thereafter have further underscored their “seniority” in actual practice. In the present context of Pakistan, the COAS remains prominent as a political troubleshooter extraordinary. Today the Chairman JCSC, despite the fact that almost all the incumbents have been excellent professional soldiers before they were upgraded to this slot, is a living symbol of how “ceremonial” that post of Chairman JCSC has become. To avoid redundancy in efforts and resources, it makes sense for a single individual to hold the positions of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) and Chief of Army Staff (COAS). The Chairman JCSC should serve as a hands-on commander of the land forces, and this can only be achieved if he holds concurrent command of both roles. Combining the appointment of the Chairman JCSC and Land Forces Commander would also ensure that all promotions and postings (beyond the level of Brigadier i.e. one-star and equivalent in the Navy and the Air Force) would be the prerogative of the Chairman JCSC. He should also wield veto power, exercised when necessary, at and below postings and promotions below one-star rank.
In the days after the recent conflict with India, which ended with the ceasefire on 10 May 2025, there was a lot of congratulatory ads in the media, both print and electronic, on the tremendous success of the Pakistan Armed Forces in degrading India’s defence capabilities in a matter of six hours, having faced sustained Indian aggression all over Pakistan for 72 hours. The important thing to note was that almost all the ads depicted the photos of the Army, Navy and Air Force Service Chiefs. There was no sign of the Chairman JCSC, nominally the senior-most Services officer of the Armed Forces, in any of the ads. The depiction was correct: it was the Army Chief who co-ordinated the all-Services operation, so why continue the farce of a Chairman JCSC in its present form when everyone and his uncle knows the ground reality is different? The all-Services operations remain the prerogative of the Army Commander, and he should also be the Chairman JCSC.
With the concurrent command, we could re-designate him as C-in-C Armed Forces for Defence Services. When Gen Musharraf took over as Acting Chairman, we had a person as COAS who could take decisions for all the Services as necessary; that is the imperative of a superior command. In that sense, the use of the phrase GHQ (General Headquarters) as opposed to Army HQ is very significant. One feels that the JCSC structure can be modified to reflect reality, both together being referred to very correctly as GHQ Pakistan which should be the GHQ of all the three Services, not only of the Pakistan Army. It was also expected that a Nuclear Command Authority would function with the Chairman JCSC as the man with the finger on the button, directly reporting to the PM. Moreover, there is a need for having a separate HQ for Homeland Security under the Chairman JCSC with all paramilitary forces dealing with internal security coming under this HQ.
Note: Re-produced from various articles written from 1995 onwards and recently on May 17, 2025 as addition to the 15 Volume “Ikram Sehgal Series”, Volume 16 “National Security Strategy for Pakistan – Tapping the Out-of-the-Box NATURAL INTELLIGENCE (NI)”, currently under publication.
The writer is the Co Chairman of Pathfinder Group. He is a retired Army officer and a defence analyst.
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