Najm us Saqib
No one won the first phase of the Middle East war, except a narrow waterway. The conflict has now entered its second phase, but the seesaw opening produced only one clear victor: neither steadfast Iran, nor furious America, nor opportunistic Israel. That victor was the Strait of Hormuz.
That single choke point did what neither missiles nor diplomacy could: it changed war strategies, choked the US internationally through diplomatic and political pressure, especially after its allies refused to join in, and forced Washington to the negotiating table. Fear of collapsing economies, disrupted trade, and stalled oil supplies to eager buyers killed any chance of a nuclear strike, even if a desperate Iran had tried to save its prestige at all costs. The latest concern is: what happens if Iran loses the Strait once US minesweepers address underwater challenges? Fortunately, nothing like this seems possible.
The Islamabad talks pulled Pakistan into global geopolitics, a fringe benefit of its image as a regional security stabiliser. The world saw an American leader shake hands with an Iranian leader after over four decades, in the middle of a two-week ceasefire, during a war that resembled a full-dress rehearsal for World War III. The talks produced expected results: a way forward to end the war, while core issues among Israel, the US, and Iran remained unchanged from before and after the JCPOA. The more things change, the more they remain the same. Clearly, the three warring sides and the UN Security Council are back to square one.
Then why this war? Why so much destruction? What exactly were America’s objectives, which President Trump claimed were achieved multiple times from February 28 until the ceasefire? Was it to bring GCC countries to their economic knees? To test if a bruised Iran could hit US bases and reach Holon and Tel Aviv? To see if a regime of Washington’s choosing could be installed in Tehran? To forcefully stop Iran from building a nuclear weapon? To teach Iran a permanent lesson for all its alleged misdeeds — Hamas, Houthis, Hezbollah, nuclear and missile programmes, American hostages — since 1979?
Or was the strategic objective to seize enriched uranium at Uran or Bushehr? To take Kharg Island under the pretext of an existential threat to Israel? To gauge how China and Russia would aid an American adversary, and how far? To take a step toward Greater Israel, after Gaza’s decimation and new West Bank settlements? Or simply to secure Netanyahu’s political survival and indulge Trump’s unpredictability?
The answer is all of the above, plus one thing. Fully aware of the ‘wolf at the door,’ Israel had long wanted the US to attack Iran directly on any pretext, to remove the pebble from its shoe once and for all. A dream come true for Israel. That explains why, when Israel saw J.D. Vance preparing his travel bags for Islamabad and glimpsed a possible end to the war, it intensified attacks on Lebanon.
Israel never wanted those talks. Islamabad does not recognise Israel. Pakistan’s tilt toward Iran was obvious. The talks would bring Pakistan closer to the US, an unwelcome sight for Israel. India, Israel’s South Asian ally, would be belittled vicariously. And why would Pakistan become the permanent pitstop for any warring parties? Of all nations, how did Pakistan host talks to end a war Israel started? For the US, it was a difficult decision, but Washington withstood Israeli pressure. Perhaps President Trump had it in mind when he said, ‘Pakistan knows Iran very well’ after Field Marshal Asim Munir met him in Washington.
Those who say the US started a lethal war without an exit strategy are right. The expected four-day war stretched past forty days with no substantial US gain, embarrassing a superpower and proving Iran’s military prowess and national resolve. No exit strategy. Yet President Trump and his administration knew the two ‘great guys’ from Pakistan would provide face-saving when needed. That is exactly what happened.
If Phase I was about military stalemate, Phase II is about diplomatic theatre, where the real winners and losers are harder to spot but easier to predict. Amid Pakistan’s enthusiastic shuttle diplomacy, we see a possible delay in Iran building a nuclear weapon, a temporary suspension of its nuclear programme, but no dismantling. Iran’s missile programme, supported by its ‘friends’, remains. Yet Iran must reassure concerns about ever building a bomb. The US knows it cannot stop Iran’s nuclear ambition, and that very impossibility is Iran’s Achilles’ heel, because it leaves Tehran permanently vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes. Asking Israel to dismantle its own nuclear programme is not possible. Thus, stalemate persists, with changes mostly on America’s terms. However, the US must guarantee no future attack on Iran, a promise even Iran knows is hollow. Lifting sanctions? No. Unfreezing assets? No.
Question: Is blocking the Strait the last American offensive before Washington exits the war? Considering America’s eagerness to be at the negotiating table, twice now, this may be a prelude to announcing Iran’s unconditional surrender and America’s total victory — a possible fictional end.
What follows will not be peace. Call it a pause before another military adventure. The war has left an unsatisfied America, a discontented Iran, and an anguished Israel. Middle East geopolitics and its perennial issues, including the desire to ‘control’ the region and the two-state solution, remain. The region is exactly where it has always been, with future wars looming large. This was not the Middle East’s final war. The US will be better prepared next time. Meanwhile, Iran will safeguard its interests and prepare for another war at any moment. Unlike before, Iran now knows its friends will not abandon it, not out of love but out of self-interest. Their own national interests, in Middle Eastern geopolitics and geoeconomics, coincidentally favour Iran. In the end, a word of advice for the US and Israel from Napoleon Bonaparte: you must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war.
The writer is a former Ambassador of Pakistan and author of eight books in three languages. He can be reached at najmussaqib1960@msn.com
