India has never had any direct military presence in Afghanistan, but the Indian military has beendeeply involved in the development of an Afghan national army, a police force and – above all the national intelligence service which they virtually run. For all practical purposes, Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security Intelligence (NDSI) is an outpost of RAW. No wonder Amrullah Saleh, Ghani’s Presidential running mate and the former Head of NDSI is the “Indian” candidate.
Thousands of Indian nationals in Afghanistan are working in reconstruction companies, international aid agencies or are Indian government employees working at the consulates and embassies thus widening India’s footprint. All four of India’s consulates are bases for espionage and for funnelling aid to separatist rebels in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan.
A potentially potent means of Indian influence is education. More than 1,000 Afghan students go to India every year on scholarships provided by the Indian government; Writers and artists benefit from the India-Afghanistan Foundation, a cultural and academic exchange program that gives small grants. This and other educational programs help India cultivate ties with the elite of every Afghan ethnic group and with India. Apart from scholarships Afghan public servants were granted access to government training institutions in India for periods ranging from days to six months. The success of this method is visible: According to the ‘Foreign Policy’ journal, which analysed perceptions about India especially among Pashtuns from Kabul to Kandahar, “the widespread support in the Pashtun heartland for an even greater Indian role in rebuilding the Afghan economy and society” is “striking”.
When US peace negotiations started in earnest India had to ponder what would be their fate if a peace was negotiated that included a sizeable section of the Taliban into future Afghan governments. So far India had not had any contacts to the Taliban and those would not have liked to talk to Indians either. India’s urgent search for options so far has been that it seeks dialogue with ethnic Pashtuns, the Taliban’s base. Some analysts interpret this shift as opening the door to changing India’s long-standing policy of refusing to deal with the Taliban. The London Conference in January 2010, in which the US and NATO resolved to include the Taliban in any political solution forced India’s hand in the matter. The stalling of the US peace negotiations with the Taliban may be a temporary gain of time for India but it seems more to do with infighting with the US Administration between the US State Department, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Pentagon.
The leader of the die-hards against any deal was the Head John Belton. He opposed Pakistan in every issue under the sun but was kept in checkby senior hands of the US diplomatic community. He was supported in his venom by Lisa Curtis who was selected by him for the NSC. He seems to have temporarily prevailed over Trump in postponing the talks but his resignation seems was the reaction from Trump who was looking forward to a deal, and must have woken up frustrated the next morning. How soon the deal will be put back in place will depend upon Trump getting his policy back on the rails but to India’s deep frustration, it will happen sooner rather than later (the writer is a defence and security analyst).
Concluded
