Anam Astafa
Throughout my years of studying political science, democracy was almost always presented as the preferred model of governance. It was discussed as a political achievement, a safeguard of public representation and a system through which societies could shape their collective future. But theory and practice do not always tell the same story. From John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau to John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville, some of the most influential political thinkers explored the relationship between popular consent, individual liberty, political participation and the legitimacy of the state. Even Karl Marx, despite his criticism of liberal parliamentary democracy and the capitalist state, addressed the question of human emancipation and the ability of people to exercise control over their political and social conditions. Democracy, in its various interpretations, became one of the defining political ideas of the modern world.
Yet, when we look at the world today, a rather uncomfortable question arises: are the very political systems that were built around the promise of popular sovereignty gradually losing their substance? Elections continue to take place, political leaders claim public mandates, and governments speak of representing the people. However, beneath this familiar democratic structure, something appears to be changing. Institutions are under pressure, political divisions are deepening, and the concentration of power is becoming a growing concern. Democracy is not disappearing everywhere, nor are all democratic systems following the same trajectory, but its global decline is difficult to ignore.
The findings of the V-Dem Institute’s Democracy Report 2026 reinforce this concern. According to its assessment, the global level of democracy for the average citizen has fallen to levels last seen in 1978, while the United States has lost its long-standing classification as a liberal democracy in the institute’s dataset. Freedom House, meanwhile, reported that global freedom declined for the twentieth consecutive year in 2025. These assessments use different methodologies, but both point towards a troubling direction. The question is no longer confined to countries that have struggled to establish democratic institutions. It now concerns established democracies that once presented themselves as examples for the rest of the world.
The United States occupies a central place in this discussion, not simply because of its domestic political developments, but because of its influence on the international system. For decades, Washington presented democracy, constitutional government and individual freedoms as central elements of its political identity. Its institutions, including Congress, the judiciary and the free press, were designed to restrain the concentration of power and prevent the executive from becoming the sole authority in the state. However, the growing polarization of American politics has exposed the pressures facing this model. Political opponents are increasingly treated as threats rather than legitimate participants in democratic competition. Institutional disputes have become more intense, trust in political processes has weakened, the decline of press freedom adds another troubling dimension to this picture. Although the American press continues to enjoy constitutional protection and remains diverse, its independence has come under growing pressure over the years. The situation has become more concerning amid renewed attacks on journalists, restrictions on
media access and pressure on outlets critical of the government, and the limits of executive authority have become a central question. Freedom House’s 2026 assessment also recorded a decline in the United States, legislative dysfunction, growing executive dominance and concerns surrounding civil liberties and anticorruption safeguards. This does not mean that American democracy has ceased to function or that its institutions have lost all capacity to resist political pressure.
The country retains constitutional mechanisms The more important question is whether these mechanisms can continue to operate effectively when political conflict itself begins to undermine confidence in their legitimacy. Europe presents a different but closely connected picture. The continent has long associated democratic government with the rule of law, political pluralism, human rights and institutional accountability. Yet several European countries are experiencing growing political fragmentation, the rise of nationalist and populist movements, and disputes over immigration, national identity, judicial independence and press freedom.
The rise of these movements, many voters support them through democratic elections because they feel that established political parties have failed to address their economic concerns, security fears or cultural anxieties. This is the central paradox of modern democracy; a government may win an election and still weaken the safeguards that protect democracy beyond that election. Majority support gives a government the authority to govern, but it does not remove the need for accountability, judicial independence or protection for political minorities. Europe is not experiencing a uniform democratic collapse.
But the pressures on democratic institutions raise questions about whether the political center can retain public confidence and whether democratic systems can respond to genuine public grievances without sacrificing their own foundations. Asia adds another dimension to the debate because it does not follow a single political model.
Japan and South Korea have established competitive democratic systems, while India, Indonesia and other countries have their own distinct political experiences. Asia’s political future cannot be understood through a simple contest between Western democracy and an authoritarian alternative. Countries have different histories, social structures, development priorities and political expectations. Economic growth and state capacity may influence how governments are judged, but neither can automatically replace political accountability or civil liberties. Equally, democratic institutions cannot maintain public confidence indefinitely if they fail to deliver security, economic opportunity and effective governance.
The United States continues to possess enormous military, economic and technological power. China has expanded its global influence and presents a different model of political and economic organisation. Russia continues to challenge the existing European security order, while regional powers pursue their own interests with greater independence. Meanwhile, countries across the Global South are seeking greater influence in international institutions and more room to maneuver between competing centers of power. democratic decline can change the way international power is exercised. If governments become less accountable at home, their foreign policies may become more closely tied to the
preferences of political leaders and less constrained by institutional scrutiny. If democratic states become inconsistent in their defense of international law and human rights, their credibility suffers. he post-Cold War period encouraged the expectation that electoral democracy and liberal institutions would gradually expand. That expectation has not been fulfilled in the straightforward manner many once anticipated. Instead, political systems have diverged, established alliances have come under pressure, and international institutions face growing questions about their effectiveness and legitimacy. The situation is further complicated by the fact that democracies themselves do not always act in accordance with the principles they proclaim. Inconsistencies provide opportunities for rival powers to question Western intentions, but they also create a genuine problem of credibility. The answer is not to abandon democratic principles; it is to apply them with greater consistency.
The world is therefore facing two interconnected questions. Can democracy recover its institutional strength and public credibility? And can the international system establish a workable order when its most influential powers disagree over political principles, strategic interests and the rules of engagement? There is no simple answer to either question. Democracy cannot be sustained by elections alone; just as international stability cannot be sustained by military and economic power alone. Both require institutions that command a degree of public trust, rules that are applied and mechanisms through which power can be challenged without destroying the system itself. The irony is that democracy remains one of the most influential political ideals in the world, even as the institutions built around it face mounting pressure. People continue to demand representation, accountability and the freedom to determine their own political futures. Yet the systems expected to fulfil those demands are struggling with polarization, distrust and the concentration of power. A new world order is taking shape, but its final form remains uncertain. It may produce new balances of power and new forms of cooperation, or it may deepen existing rivalries and make international politics more unpredictable. What remains unclear is whether democracy will emerge from this period with renewed strength or become increasingly limited to the rituals of elections and political representation.
The real test of democracy, ultimately, is not whether governments can claim a popular mandate. It is whether the people retain the power to question them, restrain them and replace them. Until these questions are answered, the world will remain caught between the democratic promise on which much of modern political thought was built and a new geopolitical reality whose direction is still uncertain.
Former member of foreign correspondent club, Hong-Kong.
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