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Police Officers and the Privileges Committee (I)

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Zeshan Haider
It is a bitter but undeniable reality that public confidence in the police in Pakistan remains far from satisfactory. Complaints about police performance, the traditional “thana culture,” alleged misuse of authority, delays in the registration and investigation of cases, and inappropriate behaviour by some personnel frequently make headlines. Yet, while discussing these shortcomings, we must not overlook another important reality: thousands of police officers and personnel continue to perform their duties under extremely difficult circumstances, often putting their lives at risk to protect citizens and maintain law and order.
Recently, a video of a meeting of the Privileges Committee of the Punjab Assembly circulated widely on social media. During the proceedings, the Regional Police Officer Faisalabad and the DIG Operations Lahore were summoned before the committee and faced questions from its members.
There is certainly nothing wrong with holding public officials accountable. In fact, accountability is an essential feature of a democratic system. Elected representatives have every right to raise the problems of their constituents and demand answers from government departments. However, while exercising this right, a distinction must be maintained between legitimate accountability and public humiliation.
The police must be answerable for their actions, but accountability should be institutional, evidence-based and aimed at correcting shortcomings rather than merely reprimanding individuals.
During the committee proceedings, a Member of the Provincial Assembly from Khushab also raised concerns regarding certain practices allegedly prevalent at police checkpoints and the treatment of citizens, including those who possess complete documentation. Such complaints deserve serious attention. If a citizen with valid documents is unnecessarily stopped, harassed or asked for money, it is not merely an individual inconvenience; it damages public trust in the entire institution.
But this raises a larger question: Can the problems of policing be solved simply by holding individual police officers responsible?
The answer, in my view, is no.
Some time ago, I had the opportunity to participate in a discussion with police officers and personnel in Sargodha on the subject of “Changing the Thana Culture.” The gathering included DSPs, Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors, ASIs, Head Constables and Constables. The discussion continued for almost three hours.
Public complaints about the police were discussed openly, but, importantly, police personnel were also given an opportunity to speak about the difficulties they face in performing their duties.
That discussion left a lasting impression. It became clear that the problems of policing cannot simply be attributed to the intentions or attitudes of individual officers. A significant part of the problem lies in the institutional and administrative environment in which the police are expected to function.
A police station requires basic resources to perform even its most routine responsibilities. It needs stationery, fuel, vehicles, communication facilities and funds for official travel. An investigating officer may have to travel hundreds of kilometres to arrest a suspect, record the statement of a witness, collect evidence or pursue an investigation. Police personnel may also have to appear before courts and undertake numerous other official assignments.
The question is simple: Are sufficient and timely official resources available for all these responsibilities?
If a police station does not receive adequate funds for its legitimate operational requirements, informal arrangements inevitably become more likely. This does not justify corruption or bribery—far from it. Any police official who demands or accepts illegal gratification must be held accountable according to law.
But if we genuinely want to eliminate corruption, we must address both the individual wrongdoing and the institutional weaknesses that allow such practices to develop.
For example, if a police vehicle has no fuel and an officer asks a citizen to provide money for its operation, the officer cannot be excused for demanding money. At the same time, the administration must also be asked why an official vehicle was left without the resources necessary for the performance of an official duty.
Similarly, if an investigating officer is required to travel a long distance but does not receive legitimate travelling expenses in time, the problem cannot be viewed solely as an individual matter. It is also an administrative issue that requires institutional attention.
Another major challenge is political interference.
A police officer who has to make professional decisions while facing political pressure, the threat of transfer or the displeasure of an influential person cannot always be expected to perform his duties with complete independence. If we want impartial policing, police officers must be given sufficient professional space to enforce the law without fear or favour.
This does not mean that police officers should be above accountability. On the contrary, an empowered police force must also be a highly accountable police force.
Unfortunately, public debate on police reform often focuses only on the behaviour of lower-ranking personnel. We tell police officers to improve their attitude towards citizens—and rightly so. But institutional reform cannot end there.
Police reform must also address training, working conditions, welfare, technology, investigation, accountability mechanisms, financial resources, merit-based promotions and administrative independence.
The lower ranks of the police force deserve particular attention. Constables, Head Constables, ASIs and other field personnel frequently perform long and difficult duties under considerable pressure. They may spend hours on roads, at checkpoints, in courts, during investigations and at crime scenes. Their responsibilities are enormous, yet their professional and welfare needs do not always receive adequate attention.
To be Continued
Police Officers and the Privileges Committee (II)

A police officer who is exhausted, poorly equipped and working under constant pressure is not in the best position to provide the quality of public service that society expects.
Therefore, improving police performance also requires improving the working conditions of police personnel.
The Police Order 2002 generated considerable debate about police reform and introduced important principles concerning the organization and functioning of the police. However, the country has struggled to maintain the continuity and consistency required for comprehensive police reform. Various governments have announced measures and initiatives, but lasting institutional transformation requires sustained political and administrative commitment.
We must now move beyond temporary campaigns and cosmetic changes.
A genuine reform agenda should ensure that police stations have transparent operational budgets; investigating officers receive legitimate travelling and investigation expenses on time; vehicles and communication equipment are properly maintained; modern technology is used in investigation and crime prevention; recruitment and promotions are based on merit; police personnel receive appropriate training; and effective mechanisms exist for dealing with misconduct.
At the same time, citizens must be provided with accessible mechanisms for lodging complaints against police officials, while police officers must also be protected from false accusations and undue pressure.
This is where the role of parliamentary and assembly committees becomes particularly important.
A Privileges Committee or any other competent forum should certainly question police officers where there are credible complaints or allegations of negligence. But such proceedings should also examine the institutional circumstances behind the problem.
If a police station is accused of poor performance, the committee should ask not only, “Who is responsible?” but also, “What resources were available?”
If an investigating officer failed to pursue a case effectively, the inquiry should determine not only whether there was negligence but also whether the officer had the necessary manpower, transport, funds, training and technical support.
If complaints of corruption arise at a checkpoint, action should certainly be taken against those found responsible. But the broader policing system should also be examined to determine whether proper supervision, transparent procedures and effective monitoring mechanisms are in place.
Accountability should therefore lead to reform—not merely punishment.
We must also remember that the police are not a homogeneous institution. There are certainly individuals within the department whose conduct deserves criticism and, where necessary, disciplinary or legal action. But there are also officers and personnel who demonstrate exceptional courage, honesty and dedication.
Many police officers have lost their lives while protecting the public. Their sacrifices should not be forgotten merely because the department as a whole faces criticism.
The dignity of a police officer and the rights of a citizen are not contradictory. In fact, they are complementary.
A citizen needs protection from police misconduct, while a police officer needs protection from political interference, inadequate resources, unfair treatment and unjustified public humiliation. A modern system of policing must protect both.
The ultimate objective should be to create a police station where a citizen can walk in without fear, register a complaint without paying a bribe, receive respectful treatment and expect action according to law.
At the same time, the police officer working inside that station should have the resources, training, authority and professional independence required to perform his duties effectively.
This is what genuine police reform should mean.
Therefore, police officers should certainly be questioned in Privileges Committees. They should be required to explain their decisions, and negligence or misconduct should be dealt with according to law. But committees should also ask some equally important questions:
What resources were provided to the police station?
Were the investigating officers given the necessary funds and transport?
Are police personnel receiving appropriate training and welfare facilities?
Are promotions based on merit?
Are police officers able to perform their duties without political pressure?
And perhaps the most important question:
What institutional reforms are necessary to ensure that the same complaint does not arise again?
If we begin looking for answers to these questions, we may discover that some problems cannot be solved merely by changing an officer. They require changes in the system itself.
The rule of law is not the sole responsibility of the police. Politicians, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the media, civil society and citizens all have a role to play in creating a lawful and orderly society.
The police certainly need reform. But police reform should not be reduced to criticism of individual officers or occasional disciplinary proceedings. It must be a comprehensive effort to build a professional, adequately resourced, technologically equipped, politically neutral and accountable institution.
In the end, the message is simple:
Hold the police accountable—but give them the resources to perform.
Demand that they obey the law—but protect them from political pressure.
Question misconduct—but do not forget the sacrifices of those who have given their lives in the line of duty.
A strong police force is not merely a government department. It is one of the most visible manifestations of the state’s authority, the rule of law and the protection of citizens.
Pakistan does not need a police force that is merely powerful. It needs a police force that is professional, impartial, adequately resourced, publicly accountable and firmly bound by the law.
Because policing will not improve merely by reprimanding police officers. It will improve when we reform the system in which those officers are required to work.