“Pakistan considers its friendship with China vital for peace and stability in the region,” Ishaq Dar told Wang Yi during meetings in Beijing this week, where discussions focused on the next phase of bilateral cooperation.
It was a deliberate line, delivered at a moment when Pakistan’s diplomatic margin for error is narrow and the regional environment increasingly unforgiving.
Pakistan today operates in a harsher external setting than at any point since the early 2000s. Its western border remains unsettled, its eastern frontier frozen, and its leverage with traditional Western partners constrained by economic exposure and shifting geopolitical priorities. In this landscape, continuity carries weight. China represents that continuity in practical, not sentimental, terms.
Beijing is Pakistan’s largest bilateral creditor, with exposure estimated at roughly $30 billion, accounting for close to 30 per cent of Pakistan’s external debt. It remains a central defence partner and the only major power willing to engage Islamabad simultaneously on security, infrastructure, and long-term diplomacy. Bilateral trade crossed $23 billion in 2024, up more than 10 per cent year-on-year. The relationship endures because it answers strategic needs on both sides.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is where those needs intersect most visibly. Since its launch, total committed investment has expanded from an initial $46 billion to roughly $62-65 billion. CPEC-linked power projects added over 8,000 megawatts to the national grid, easing chronic shortages that once shaved an estimated two percentage points off annual GDP growth. Connectivity projects linked long-neglected regions to major markets, reducing transport times and logistics costs for industry and agriculture. The slowdown between 2018 and 2022 did not negate these gains. Instead, they exposed how quickly momentum weakens when political focus drifts, and administrative discipline loosens.
Since 2022, Islamabad has worked to restore credibility. Outstanding dues to Chinese energy firms have been partially cleared, security coordination strengthened, and policy emphasis shifted away from large-scale construction toward industrial cooperation, agriculture, and technology. That shift reflects a necessary recognition: infrastructure alone does not generate resilience or foreign exchange.
China understands this evolution but expects execution. Provincial bottlenecks, regulatory delays, and mixed political signals impose measurable costs. So do repeated attacks on Chinese personnel and projects, which strike at the core of trust and deterrence and carry implications well beyond optics.
Pakistan’s domestic debate often misreads this equation. One camp treats China as a substitute for reform. Another frames the relationship as dependency. Both miss the point. China does not replace governance. It rewards coherence.
The Beijing meetings matter because they signal an effort to restore that coherence at the diplomatic level. Pakistan is conveying that despite internal noise, its strategic bearings remain intact.
Yet patience has limits. If Pakistan is to preserve the space this partnership provides, it must demonstrate reliability where it counts: policy continuity, credible security, and institutions capable of outlasting governments. *
