Imran Malik
The fourth LoE is supercharging the DIB: this means that the US will continue to be the premier arsenal of the world by reviving and restoring the US defence industry and revitalising industries shipped abroad. The US will re-invest in defence production, build capacity, empower innovators, adopt new technologies, and clear away outdated practices, policies, and regulations. The US military is to be second to none!
Despite denying it, the US is clearly recoiling west of the Atlantic. Newer strategic alignments, partnerships, alliances, friendships, agreements, etc., will consequently emerge as countries, blocs, and regions scramble to secure their respective interests in the emerging, evolving geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic dimensions!
The US national defence strategy is exuding crucial geopolitical and geostrategic implications. The US seems adamant about withdrawing west of the pond (the Atlantic). However, it does not intend to retreat into isolation, but will henceforth prioritise its vital interests with an approach based on “flexible realism” — something akin to Realpolitik. Is a contraction of the US sphere of influence then ensuing? It has redefined the paradigms that govern its relationships with its allies. It is now compelling them to share, henceforth, the burden of their collective security and defence more fairly. Free lunches, it seems, are over.
This situation has been further compounded by President Trump’s trade and tariff war, which has left the economies of almost all US allies and partners in the doldrums. Furthermore, the US national defence strategy is, in effect, a realisation of the limits of its power and resources, and of the changed dynamics of the global geopolitical and geostrategic environment. The world, including its allies, has started looking for “alternatives to US power — military, economic, political and diplomatic”. Countries and blocs are now seeking national and economic security through newer strategic alignments, partnerships, agreements, and alliances. The general direction of these efforts is ominously away from the US and towards China.
Thus, a subtle, albeit definite, geopolitical realignment is emerging globally.
The US does not intend to enter into direct confrontations with any global power(s), but will continue to focus on the “core, irreplaceable goal of winning the nation’s wars, decisively”. It intends primarily to concentrate its attention and resources on the western hemisphere (its homeland) and the IPR, without real prejudice to the interests of its allies in Europe, the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula. It plans to become the de facto regional hegemon and establish an inviolable perimeter of security in the western hemisphere, encompassing the Americas, Canada, Greenland, etc. To date, no intercontinental war has been fought on continental US soil. Now, however, it has become extremely vulnerable to cyber and hybrid threats, high-tech intercontinental and hypersonic ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bombers, drones, UCAVs, etc., all potentially coming over the Arctic region, the North Pole, Greenland, and Canada. That defines President Trump’s urgency to acquire these territories. Could he not have invoked Article 5 of the NATO Charter, termed the defence of the Continental US–Canada–Greenland complex a joint NATO objective, and yet retained it in its most pristine form?
Europe has been literally left to fight its own battles, ostensibly against Russia. Over the decades, it has been so dependent on the US that it has neglected to invest adequately in its own security and defence. Now, suddenly, the US appears to be backing off, and the Europeans feel vulnerable, defenceless, and are panicking. When the US states that it will provide critical but limited support, does this signify a nuclear umbrella (despite the UK’s and France’s nuclear arsenals) against nuclear attacks or coercion by Russia? The ongoing war in Ukraine defines Russian expansionism. If abandoned or left to fend for itself, Europe could feel compelled either to plead for peace with Russia or to seek a no-war pact — delivering a death blow to NATO.
The US National Defence Strategy paper covers the Middle East, but not Israel specifically. Iran continues to appear as the designated enemy in the region, and the Gulf Arab states are expected to defend themselves against it and its proxies. Here too, a paradigm shift is emerging, as both KSA and the UAE have assured Iran that, in the event it is attacked, their air, land, and maritime spaces will not be used against it. Most countries have yet to sign the Abraham Accords. Does this reflect a waning of US power and influence in the region? In the IPR, the US seeks to deter China through strength, but not confrontation. This represents a massive climb-down for the US — a demeaning posture to adopt. Is the US accepting that China is now an equal, peer power that can no longer be cowed or coerced into submission? Does this imply that the US is prepared to co-exist with China at the apex of the world order? Does it amount to abandoning Taiwan, or will Taiwan also receive a nuclear umbrella? Similarly, South Korea would be nervous as it confronts a nuclear-armed North Korea. Will it seek a guaranteed nuclear umbrella from the US, or hasten to pursue peace with the North Koreans?
The global geopolitical architecture is in massive flux. The US appears to have forsaken its urge to remain omnipresent and omnipotent. Seemingly, it no longer feels compelled to be the sole global hegemon and arbiter of right and wrong, the keeper of the world’s conscience, and the inevitable sustainer of a favourable balance of power for the US-led West. Although the desired end state of remaining the pre-eminent global power persists, the ways and means of achieving it have changed drastically. The US has apparently reset its strategic direction and redefined its strategic objectives. Is this a realistic course correction by President Trump, or does it portend a sorry end to US global exceptionalism and dominance? It threatens to critically upset the balance of power in most vital regions and globally. Perhaps the US has been compelled to adopt a more realistic and pragmatic approach — not only towards the state of its own economy, resources, capacities, and capabilities, but also towards emerging geopolitical and geostrategic realities. Its position as the singular military and economic power, and the redoubtable leader of the free world, is increasingly under challenge. A multipolar world beckons. The US must readjust accordingly. It now appears to be a power on the wane.
Is it time to ring in the Chinese century?
The writer is a retired brigadier of the Pakistan Army. He can be reached at im.k846@gmail.com and tweets
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