Water doesn’t respect borders, but in South Asia, it’s being turned into a weapon. As Pakistan’s rivers run thinner under climate stress and upstream control, India is tightening its grip through “dam diplomacy.” In 2025, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), once praised as a rare success in India-Pakistan relations, is no longer just about irrigation or engineering. It’s about survival, sovereignty, and the fear in Islamabad that its lifeline is being strangled, one concrete barrier at a time. The next war may not be over land or ideology, but over the slow, silent theft of a river, as water becomes the most powerful weapon never officially declared.
Pakistan’s lifeblood flows through the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab— tributaries carrying 80% of basin water and irrigating 90% of crops. In April, following a militant attack in Kashmir, India declared the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) “in abeyance,” effectively threatening to cut flows unless Pakistan reined in terrorism. With low rainfall, snow, and storage, Pakistan faces a growing risk from upstream disruption.
The IWT, brokered by the World Bank, allocates the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and reserves the western rivers for Pakistan. India may use western rivers only for limited “run-of-river” projects—bound by strict rules. The treaty contains no clause for suspension or unilateral withdrawal. Its strength has always been its durability: it held through wars, skirmishes, and crises.
But in recent years, India has pushed that boundary. Key projects like the Kishanganga and Ratle dams in Indian-administered Kashmir involve storage and design elements that Pakistan says breach the treaty. Islamabad triggered the dispute resolution process, first seeking a neutral expert, then a Court of Arbitration. India accused Pakistan of prolonging proceedings and demanded a wholesale treaty revision—a move Pakistan sees as a legal breach. This produced parallel legal channels. Pakistan sought arbitration in 2016; India instead pushed for a neutral expert. The World Bank froze both requests for years. In 2023, a CoA was finally constituted— despite India’s boycott and claim that the court was “illegally constructed.” The tribunal ruled in 2023, and reaffirmed in June 2025, that it had full jurisdiction. It made clear: India cannot suspend the treaty, and political disputes do not override legal mechanisms.
India rejected the rulings, framing its actions as countermeasures to terrorism. But legal scholars emphasise the IWT’s rigidity: it was designed to function independently of political or military tensions. Under general international water law, including the UN Watercourses Convention, upstream states have a duty of equitable use, no significant harm, and cooperation. Any deliberate restriction of flow could breach those obligations.
Pakistan has already felt the impact. In May, an 80% flow drop during Indian “maintenance” on a Kashmir barrage foreshadowed throttling risks. With reservoirs that hold only 10% of annual flow, Pakistan lacks the buffer to absorb supply shocks. And India’s refusal to share flood and flow data— once mandated by the treaty— further endangers Pakistan’s disaster readiness. Climate change intensifies the threat. Snow cover in the Indus watershed dropped over 23% between late 2023 and early 2024, and glacier melt rates are accelerating. Home to over 7,200 glaciers, the basin is among the most climate-vulnerable. By the century’s end, it could lose 30-75% of its ice, radically altering seasonal flows. India’s growing dam network and control over data compounds this vulnerability, turning water management into a strategic lever.
Analysts now view India’s water policy as part of a broader geopolitical pressure campaign. Modi’s “not even a drop goes out” cry and a planned Chenab canal expansion signal a more assertive approach. As CSIS water expert David Michel notes, even without full-scale diversions, India’s ability to withhold or delay routine flows gives it leverage. For Pakistan, that uncertainty is destabilising enough.
To safeguard its lifeline, Pakistan must act beyond legal defence. It must reframe the crisis as a violation of international norms. India’s actions set a dangerous precedent, undermining not just bilateral stability but international environmental law.
India’s “abeyance” declaration also collides with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), the global legal framework for treaty compliance. Articles 26 and 27 require good-faith performance of treaties, regardless of internal politics. Article 60 allows suspension only in cases of material breach— a threshold Pakistan hasn’t crossed. If India is allowed to sidestep the IWT on political grounds, the precedent threatens the legal integrity of all cross-border agreements.
Because at its core, the Indus Waters Treaty is more than a water-sharing deal— it’s a security pact in disguise. It was built to keep peace flowing when diplomacy failed. If India is permitted to unilaterally rewrite, suspend, or sidestep it, the consequences will ripple globally. The message to other upstream states, from the Nile to the Mekong, would be clear: water is no longer a shared resource, but a sovereign weapon. For Pakistan, this isn’t just about turbines or data; it’s about defending the idea that international law constrains might. If the world allows one of the most durable water treaties to unravel, it may soon face a future where rivers no longer bind nations together but break them apart.
The writer is a student of law at the University of Bristol.






