Sardar Salar Ahmed Sandhu
Whenever discussing Israel, each Pakistani’s reaction is grounded in anger and outrage—an understandable response given the history and current actions of Israel.
In the vast majority of these discussions, the reasons given are based on religious concerns: Israeli wars in the Middle East, the use of the “terrorist” label against Muslims by Israel and the West, the appalling genocide of Palestinians, and the threat to Masjid Al-Aqsa, a holy site for Muslims, often referred to as the first Qibla.
However, what if these discussions were grounded in the political and strategic implications of Israel’s recognition, rather than purely religious considerations?
If Pakistan were to recognise Israel, it would signify an official endorsement of Israel’s inhumane actions in Palestine, including invasions and genocide. This raises critical questions about Pakistan’s stance on similar issues, such as India’s actions in Kashmir. Would such recognition not undermine Pakistan’s credibility on the international stage? Additionally, this decision could have broader implications for Pakistan’s positions on the Durand Line and the Tribal Areas (FATA/PATA, etc.).
Pakistan has long positioned itself as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations, particularly in Kashmir, where it accuses India of human rights violations. Since Pakistan’s inception, it has fought multiple wars with India, with the Kashmir issue as the bone of contention. After India revoked Article 370 of its constitution in 2019, Pakistan has adopted an even stronger stance against India’s oppression of Muslims in Kashmir, raising its voice for Kashmiris at multiple international organisations, including the United Nations. Additionally, the scrapping of Article 35A of the Indian constitution, which allowed non-Kashmiris to buy property in the region, has raised fears that India is trying to engineer a “demographic shift” in the Muslim-majority region. Recognising Israel, considering its genocidal actions in Palestine, would be seen as a contradiction of this stance, undermining Pakistan’s moral authority on the Kashmir issue.
Moreover, such a decision might ignite widespread protests and unrest, with significant domestic backlash from social activists, religious groups, and the general public, who may view this recognition as a betrayal of Pakistan’s longstanding support for Palestine. This internal turmoil could strain law enforcement and security agencies already grappling with terrorism and insurgency, along with an already crumbling economy. On the international front, diplomatic repercussions could also follow, as this move might alienate Pakistan’s allies who support its position on Kashmir, particularly within the Muslim world and among countries sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.
Another potential conflict could arise over the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, known as the Durand Line. Although Pakistan considers it an official international border, it has never been formally recognised by successive Afghan governments as it divided ethnic Pashtun tribes. Afghanistan’s stance on this disputed boundary has implications for regional security, trade, and cross-border movements. Recognising Israel might weaken Pakistan’s position on the Durand Line, as it could be seen as compromising on principles for political expediency, potentially emboldening Afghan claims and further complicating bilateral relations.
Furthermore, the Tribal Areas (formerly FATA/PATA) have historically harboured strong sentiments against foreign intervention and imperialism. With multiple military operations conducted in these areas, including the recently discussed “Operation Azm-e-Istehkam,” anti-state sentiment is already on the rise. A key reason for this unrest is the forced displacement of locals during past operations, compelling them to leave their homes and live in refugee camps. The state must consider whether it is prepared to handle another surge of anti-state elements fuelled by perceived provincial discrimination. Recognising Israel will undoubtedly exacerbate anti-government sentiments in these regions, likely fuelling separatist movements and further complicating integration and development efforts.
Internationally, Pakistan’s foreign policy could be at risk of being seen as hypocritical for recognising a state accused of human rights abuses while simultaneously condemning similar actions by India in Kashmir. This perceived double standard could diminish any soft power that Pakistan might hold in the global arena and negatively impact Pakistan’s credibility and moral standing in international forums, including the United Nations.
While recognising Israel could bring some potential benefits, such as access to advanced Israeli technology in fields like cybersecurity and defence, it is crucial to remember that Israel’s success in these sectors is largely due to substantial and consistent support from the United States. As noted by Joe Biden, “Israel is the best $3 billion investment America makes.” This indicates that the technological advancements Pakistan might gain access to are heavily underpinned by U.S. backing. These advancements and benefits will only be available as long as the U.S. continues to support Israel. Should the U.S. shift its strategic alliances, Israel’s value to Pakistan would diminish significantly, potentially leaving Pakistan without the anticipated benefits while having already paid the strategic and diplomatic costs.
Recognising Israel would be a complex and potentially controversial move for Pakistan, with significant implications for its stance on Kashmir, the Pak-Afghan border (Durand Line), the Tribal Areas (FATA/PATA), and its international integrity. While it might open new strategic and economic opportunities, the potential for domestic and international backlash could undermine Pakistan’s credibility and moral authority on key issues. Recognising Israel could be more than just a religious nightmare; it might plunge Pakistan into a strategic quagmire.
The writer is a graduate of International Relations from Government College University Lahore.
