Dr Qaisar Rashid
In the four-day (May 7-10) low-intensity modern war, both sides of the border found a chance to vent their pent-up jingoism. More than soldiers, the media spearheaded the war. All kinds of creativity were let loose from both sides to down the enemy’s aircraft and conquer the adversary’s cities. It was like constructing a new adage: Wars are not fought on the battlefield; wars are fought in the media.
The distinguishing feature remained that Pakistan tried its best to preclude the war. Pakistan’s economy was in a shambles, hence it acted as a pre-emption. Pakistan’s diplomats approached every possible international forum to dissuade India from opening a war front. Pakistan wanted the conclusion of the inquiry into the Pahalgam massacre, which took place on April 22 in Indian-administered Kashmir, before any outbreak of war. India was piqued and impatient. Though India played the victim, its economic prowess buoyed up its haughtiness, till the afternoon of May 10 saw the conclusion of a ceasefire.
The four-day war kept looking for answers to two questions. First, could India launch missiles to annihilate any suspected terrorist networks existing on the land of Pakistan? If the answer is in the affirmative, a new lineage of conflict stands initiated: Instant war, disregarding the prospects of a nuclear confrontation. Second, what was the definition of civilians? India claimed that its initial missile strikes killed terrorists (besides disrupting their sanctuaries) in Pakistan’s certain areas, such as Sialkot, Muridk,e and Bahawalpur, whereas Pakistan claimed that it lost its civilians. Expectedly, the reverberation of these questions will continue in the coming months, with a doubtless bearing on the future of the ceasefire.
Whereas the Kargil war of 1999 respected the threshold of deterrence propped up by nuclear capability, the Balakot airstrike (in the aftermath of the Pulwama attack) in 2019 belittled the threshold. The shared international border was breached. A dog fight of airplanes ensued. Plausible deniability refused to work. International players jumped in. Peace was restored.
The Pahalgam attack of 2025 was a development over the 2019 attack. This time, aircraft respected the international border, and no dog fight ensued, as both warring countries wanted to save their planes to evade the Abhinandan redux. However, missiles and drones cracked open the international border. The role of aircraft was reduced to mere missile launchers. Plausible deniability again failed to work. International players watched from the sidelines. The Ukraine-Russia war had promoted the use of satellite imagery, which diverted its attention to capture the Pak-India conflict live.
This time, the barrier implying any nuclear threshold was also clouded. Nevertheless, the conflict showed that, before reaching any such threshold, there existed maneuvering space. That is, after the initiation of a conflict and reaching any perceived nuclear threshold, plenty of leeway existed, permitting a low-intensity conflict inundated with exchange of missiles and drones to make it a modern war. With that, the status quo expired. The concept of the conventional battlefield has become redundant, having been replaced by the modern war. Similarly, the possibility for nuclear brinkmanship fizzled out. This was the new normal.
In the new normal, more such low-intensity conflicts are imminent under one ruse or the other. Ground forces have either gone totally irrelevant, or their relevance is confined to ringing out salvos only. The age of infantry (foot soldiers) and artillery (large-caliber guns) is almost over. There is left little need for shrieking tanks and cocking rifles to conquer a piece of land. Instead, airspace has gained significance. Missiles and missile-laden drones become more relevant to surmount the airspace. The missile age has ensued. Artificial intelligence has crept in. Precision-guided munitions and hypersonic travelers are the currency. Even the option to go nuclear has been submitted to this development. Instead of the man behind the gun, the man behind the computer has gained traction. In short, both the rules and tactics of war have changed, calling for revamping.
Interestingly, during the four-day war, both countries kept denying having harboured an intent to use any missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, though both did. The reason was simple: neither of them wanted to be considered an irresponsible nuclear state resorting to a nuclear war as a first resort and earn notoriety in the eyes of the world. In this departure, the meaning of any pronounced “red line” is that it is a warning to go violent, but not nuclear.
A challenge irking Pakistan is that its past is replete with engaging in proxy wars. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif acknowledged the same recently in an interview on a foreign TV channel. Pakistan claims that it is currently not involved in any proxy war. Nevertheless, it cannot be gainsaid that the proxy war brought non-state actors to the forefront, whereas the foreign office was in the background. In principle, the foreign office should run Pakistan’s foreign policy. It should be the foreign office raising the issue of Kashmir at the international level to seek the world’s attention, instead of leaving it up to non-state actors who can disrupt peace. Certainly, in the presence of a huge, equipped standing army and trained professional diplomats, besides internationally renowned lawyers, any reliance on non-state actors to perform a task to serve Pakistan’s interests regionally or internationally is a great insult.
The point is simple: Whether or not Pakistan is involved in a proxy war anymore, the era of proxy war is also over. Now onward, non-state actors cannot be used to serve Pakistan’s strategic interests abroad. In this regard, the new normal is that the responsibility for making and executing foreign policies reverts to Pakistan’s foreign office.
The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be reached at qaisarrashid@yahoo.com
