Ali Imran Atta
Tension that had been building between Islamabad and Kabul for some time erupted into open battle when the Afghan Taliban clergy administration recently started attacks on this country, which Pak army replied heroically by repelling the aggression.
Islamabad’s civil and military leadership must forge a strategy that safeguards the nation’s borders, stabilizes internal security, and averts a significant escalation with Kabul, while unverified claims about the killing of outlawed TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud in Kabul keep on a shaky report. The defense minister again brought up the matter in the National Assembly in recent past, stating that the government was considering sending a second team to Kabul to persuade the Taliban to “dismantle safe havens” that the terrorists were using. Despite, their claims, the Afghan Taliban have actually allowed terrorists of all stripes to reside on their territory.
For instance, the Taliban were humiliated by the US strike that killed Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in the Afghan capital in 2022, which was blatantly against the terms of the Doha Agreement between the two parties. The elimination of Noor Wali Mehsud during his time in Kabul is therefore not impossible. Islamabad has already attacked Afghanistan across the border while hunting down terrorists who have caused unrest in this nation.
Yet going after militants across the border is not without risk, since it could inflame tensions further with the Taliban regime. There aren’t many decent options available in Pakistan. On the outside, it seems that the best course of action might be to keep telling the Afghan Taliban, both bilaterally and in coordination with regional allies like China, Russia, and Iran, that providing sanctuary to terrorists will have consequences, like a decline in trade or a downgrade of diplomatic ties.
It is frequently declared that Islamabad policy makers not have a distinct and well-defined Afghan policy. On the Kabul front, the clergy establishment has always primarily followed its Delhi-centric strategy. Following the overthrow of a pro-Delhi regime in Kabul, Islamabad seemed unsure of how to handle the new situation. An idealistic view of creating transnational megaprojects and fostering a friendly government in the neighborhood was embraced by a large portion of the establishment and its affiliated intelligentsia. However, Gen. Hamid Gul created this alliance to oppose Benazir Bhutto’s PPP and to maintain the alleged gains the establishment had made from its involvement in the Afghan jihad.
The Jamaat-i-Islami controlled the alliance’s intellectual discourse, whilst the PML, led principally by Nawaz Sharif, was the preferred political force of the establishment. When the establishment waged jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the JI was one of its main partners. Additionally, it has a contentious history of forcibly repressing Bengali demands for political rights, particularly by forming militias to quell the East Pakistani pro-independence movement. The JI was a key player in planting the seeds of extremism and violence in Pakistani society as an intellectual ally of the system. Even with institutional support, the JI has continuously fallen short of garnering public support or winning significant elections, which the establishment had long hoped for but never succeeded in achieving.
All things considered, the JI was crucial in assisting the establishment in formulating its Afghan policy and coordinating it with Pakistan’s more comprehensive strategic approach to India. Afghanistan has only grudgingly acknowledged Pakistan’s sovereignty since its founding, often backing separatist and ethnic movements in KP and Balochistan and keeping close links with India. Even throughout the 1965 and 1971 conflicts, Afghanistan has never directly threatened Pakistan militarily, despite the fact that it has always been a source of stress.
Despite supporting opposing blocs throughout the Cold War, Pakistan and Afghanistan have always had the chance to build friendly relations. The self-centered power elites on both sides, however, seldom ever missed an occasion to agitate or upset one another. Pakistan believed that by backing the Afghan Taliban, it would be able to establish a friendly government on its western frontier. However, some contest the establishment’s notion of a “friendly nation,” contending that it frequently suggests a desire to control or subjugate others. However, it is really simple: a change in government does not alter a nation’s national character. Relationships are ultimately shaped by realpolitik and national objectives, even in cases where new governments express gratitude to their outside supporters.
The TTP has shown the profound fault lines between Pakistan and Afghanistan, making it one of the biggest irritants in their relationship. The Afghan Taliban government seemed to choose the TTP over preserving cordial ties with Pakistan when given an option. It did this in accordance with the well-known pattern of earlier Afghan administrations addressing its relations with Islamabad. Now, Islamabad ‘s long-held goal of gaining strategic depth by taking over Kabul from Taliban has mostly fallen apart. Islamabad is having difficulty accepting its mistakes, especially the belief that a Taliban regime would serve its strategic interests without reservation, even though it may not have given up hope completely.
Therefore, the possibility of Kabul forging deeper links with Delhi, which islamabad perceives as a danger to its western flank, continues to cause concern in Islamabad. Despite continuous diplomatic attempts to preserve a minimal degree of cooperation on trade and border security, the tension in Pakistan-Afghan relations is a reflection of a long-standing hostility that keeps growing. In this tense relationship, Afghan refugees in Pakistan have become collateral damage. The TTP issue has turned into an honor issue for the Taliban, who want to preserve it as a resource. They have put their relationship with Pakistan at risk by defending the group, and they have demonstrated little regard for the well-being of Afghan nationals living in Pakistan. In the meantime, the Taliban are encouraging. Pakistan, having shown its ability to defend itself and repel assault, should prevent the situation from escalating. Though there have been minor conflicts in the past, this is the most serious flareup in recent memory. Pakistan must also be careful of India and the Afghan Taliban, who were once bitter foes, suddenly improving relations, with the Afghan foreign minister recently enjoying a warm welcome in New Delhi. As a result, it would be detrimental to this country’s interests to allow relations with Kabul to deteriorate further, no matter how strained. At the heart of the situation is Pakistan’s genuine grievance that Afghanistan supports vicious terrorists hostile to our country. In fact, the world community recognizes that Kabul provides a safe haven not only for the TTP but also for other terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, ETIM, (East Turkestan Islamic Movement) and so on. If terrorist groups continue to launch attacks inside Pakistan, Pakistan must respond.
However, while kinetic cross-border action is necessary in the face of foreign aggression, it is not a long-term solution because it risks launching a full-fledged war with the Kabul regime. Pakistan has demonstrated that it can effectively defend itself in the battlefield. The attention must now move to diplomacy to address the terrorism threat. Working with Muslim nations that have assisted in defusing the situation and interacting with Kabul-influencing regional friends like China are two ways to achieve this.
The writer is a PhD candidate at QAU and has worked at SDPI.
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