Ali Anwar
In international relations, geography often dictates economic realities more firmly than political rhetoric. Afghanistan, a country long troubled by internal conflict and external dependence, continues to describe itself as the “heart of Asia.” Yet the hard truth is that its geography neither supports this claim nor provides the economic leverage often projected by its leadership. The country remains landlocked, geopolitically constrained, and economically reliant on a single major corridor Pakistan. Recently, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar asserted that Kabul intends to seek “alternative trade routes” beyond Pakistan. The statement may resonate politically within Afghanistan, but its practical feasibility collapses when viewed through the lens of geography, economics, and logistics.
Six countries border Afghanistan, but none offer it a viable gateway to global markets. Its northern neighbours, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, share limited political trust with Kabul and have little demand for Afghan exports. These Central Asian states have surplus agricultural products, abundant energy reserves, and little incentive to import Afghanistan’s fragile, low-volume commodities. The larger issue is infrastructure. Afghanistan lacks a modern rail network, dependable highways, and efficient logistics. Even the limited trade with Central Asia becomes expensive due to poor connectivity and higher transportation costs.
Among the so-called “alternatives,” Iran’s Chabahar Port is often highlighted. But the reality is far from the optimistic narrative promoted by Kabul’s political leadership.
First, Chabahar sits under the shadow of U.S. sanctions. Its operational status relies on temporary waivers that may or may not be extended every six months. No country can base long-term trade planning on such uncertainty.
Second, the Iranian land route is significantly longer and more expensive. Shipments that reach India in 22-25 days through Karachi take 45-60 days via Iran. Transport expenses rise by 30-50 per cent, and each container incurs an additional $2,000 to $2,500 in cost on the Iranian route.
This makes Afghan exports 83% of which are perishable fruits, vegetables, and herbs highly vulnerable to spoilage. Cold-chain logistics further increase the cost, making Afghan goods uncompetitive in Indian markets.
Third, air cargo remains prohibitively expensive. A war-torn, resource-scarce country simply cannot rely on air shipments as a sustainable trade channel.
Geography does not bend for political convenience. Despite rhetoric, over 90% of trade between Afghanistan and India still passes through Pakistan’s Wagah border. Likewise, Afghanistan’s imports and exports rely overwhelmingly on Karachi and Port Qasim, where goods arrive within three to four days.
Pakistan remains Afghanistan’s fastest, cheapest, and most stable access route to global markets.
Contrary to the prevailing narrative, Pakistan suffers more from Afghan trade than it gains. Illegal trade, smuggling, and the re-entry of Afghan transit goods into Pakistan’s black market collectively cause losses exceeding four trillion rupees annually. Security expenditures due to terrorism originating from Afghan soil add to the financial burden.
Thus, if Afghanistan chooses to reduce its dependence on Pakistan, Islamabad would face no economic loss only financial relief.
The writer is an old Aitchisonian who believes in freedom of expression, a freelance columnist, entrepreneur and social activist.
