Dr. Syed Zeeshan Haider
Two regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran, agreed on the restoration of relations that had been broken for seven years. In the past two years, negotiations to restore diplomatic relations have seen varying degrees of success and failure with Iraq’s and Omani governments acting as mediators before China made its latest attempt. After all, by showing that both countries have the political will to use diplomacy as a way of resolving their differences, these negotiations continued and ended well with China’s help.
The last decade has pushed Riyadh-Tehran relations beyond classical, political, and religious rivalries. It is the securitization and militarization of relations that have become the dominant trend in this period. Despite the opportunities, the agreement presents to resolve regional problems between the two countries. The agreement will remain vulnerable to the security policy of both countries.
On the Saudi side, Riyadh will continue to improve its missile defense and anti-drone capabilities by working with China, the United States, and other partners. It will also seek to acquire nuclear technology know-how, albeit for civilian use, and it will do what it needs to strengthen its indigenous military industry, which Iran might perceive as a threat to its security.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia will open up politically and economically to countries such as Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq, because it believes that stability and security in the region can be enhanced through economic prosperity. However, Iran might see such an opening as a threat to its influence in the region. More importantly, Saudi Arabia will seek to maintain strong ties with the United States for historical and security reasons. Iran might remain skeptical of the consequences of these relations as it seeks to expel the United States from the region.
Finally, as Iran is a nuclear threshold state, close to developing nuclear weapons, if it so desires, Saudi Arabia has an interest in maintaining some pressure on Iran to return to the nuclear deal. Iran might perceive this as an unconstructive gesture that goes against the spirit of the agreement. Tehran views the military aspects of the above developments as a threat to the regional offensive-defensive balance. It will, therefore, likely continue efforts to launch proper countermeasures. Although Tehran may agree to limit equipping the Houthis with new advanced, offensive weapon systems, the policy of upholding an Iran-backed axis of resistance as a pillar of the country’s deterrence in the region is unlikely to change as long as its military has limited conventional alternatives and the U.S-Israeli threat remains unchanged. This means Tehran will continue the policy of qualitative improvement of the axis of resistance’s operational capability, including through horizontal operational linkages among Shiite groups and raising their interoperability capabilities.
When it comes to the nuclear dossier, the dynamics between Iran on one hand and the U.S. and Israel on the other will remain the critical variable in determining outcomes. Therefore, this issue will not be meaningfully impacted by the Saudi-Iranian detente. That means that the Kingdom’s fear of Iran getting nuclear weapons will persist if U.S.-Iran talks continue to falter—a fact that may force Saudi Arabia to build up its own nuclear capability at some point. Any change in Riyadh’s nuclear policy will then contribute to Iran’s nuclear calculus and proper response. Thus, the complex puzzle of the U.S.-Iran-KSA-Israel nuclear conundrum will remain in place.
In short, deterrence and containment will remain a core policy for both sides. Diplomatic normalization will certainly help to calm tensions, but it will be insufficient to reverse these trends. By looking at U.S.-Russia relations, one might gain an understanding of how a combined strategy of deterrence and containment can remain in place and generate tensions, while diplomatic ties exist.
I pray to ALLAH Almighty, May this agreement turns into unity forever between the two major regional powers of Muslim Ummah. Think to be a Muslim not as a Sunni or Shia.
