India’s appetite for military adventurism appears undiminished by the lessons of May 2025. On October 15, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh threatened an even stronger response to any future terrorist attack originating from Pakistan. Two days earlier, Pakistan’s National Command Authority adviser, retired Lt Gen Mazhar Jamil, had warned at a London security forum that New Delhi’s military doctrines betrayed a poor grasp of nuclear realities. His remarks, made public this week, put a finger on the conceit driving India’s military calculations: New Delhi believes it can throw the first punch and still call the shots thereafter.
Under the Modi government, sabre-rattling has become something of a national pastime. Punitive strikes, military threats and diplomatic arm-twisting are dressed up as demonstrations of strategic strength. But New Delhi appears to have confused the possession of superior conventional firepower with the ability to bring Pakistan to heel. The latter is a far taller order. Escalation dominance looks impressive on paper and it is considerably harder to establish when the adversary refuses to follow the script.
The four-day confrontation in May 2025 should have knocked some sense into India’s military planners. Indian strikes drew Pakistani retaliation, and the ensuing exchanges laid bare the limits of New Delhi’s calculations. India’s handling of military technology provides little comfort either. In March 2022, a BrahMos missile landed in Pakistan following what New Delhi described as an accidental launch. A missile crossing an international border through an operational blunder is hardly a minor lapse. Had the incident occurred in the thick of hostilities, there might have been no time to establish whether it was a mistake or a deliberate strike. Such are the dangers of playing fast and loose with military escalation. Jamil’s criticism of Hindutva’s influence on Indian strategic thinking also deserves scrutiny. Under Modi, muscular nationalism has become political currency, with threats against Pakistan serving as a ready means of rallying domestic support. The difficulty with continually talking tough is that sooner or later a government becomes a prisoner of its own rhetoric.
India’s Western partners should also take a harder look at the military policies they are helping to equip. New Delhi enjoys access to sophisticated weaponry and considerable diplomatic indulgence, even as its decision to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance has opened another front of confrontation. An international arbitral tribunal has ruled that the treaty remains binding, a finding India rejects. Treaty obligations, however, cannot simply be wished away whenever they become inconvenient.
Pakistan has every reason to maintain credible deterrence and reject attempts at military coercion. Restraint must not be confused with helplessness, nor should defence readiness become an excuse for reckless escalation. New Delhi, meanwhile, would do well to abandon its habit of mistaking threats for strategy. It is easy to promise a short war from a political podium. Stopping one after the missiles start flying is another matter altogether.
