Atif Mehmood
In the world we have today, Europe rearming is something it used to run from: rearming. Geopolitics can no longer be a high ideal or abstraction among diplomats and think tanks. It is now an impelling, inevitable force that defines budgets, economies, identities, and decisions. Following years when security was considered secondary or discretionary, defence now stands at the forefront.
Figures speak for themselves. In 2024, military spending in Europe increased by 17 per cent, amounting to some 693 billion dollars, with Europe becoming the prime driver of worldwide spikes in defence expenditure. The increase was a record one. Almost all European nations increased their defence spending in the year, apart from one tiny republic. Military spending now stands at its highest since the Cold War ended. In the European Union alone, military spending in 2024 reached some 343 billion euros, around 1.9 per cent of GDP. Estimates suggest it should grow to 381 billion in 2025. In the span of only three years, the republics of the European Union have increased defence spending by more than 30 per cent in real terms.
This rearmament is in no way uniform or unequivocal. States close to Russia or other hot spots have been raising spending the most vigorously. Poland ranks among the most ambitious. It increased defence expenditure from 2.7 per cent of GDP in 2022 to more than 4.2 per cent in 2024, targeting 4.7 per cent in 2025. Germany, supported by a special defence fund, increased its military budget by more than 28 per cent in 2024 and is spearheading the Western European effort. States in southern Europe are more circumspect. Spain, for instance, faces political demands that it should focus spending socially and not increase military expenditure. The result shows how strategic urgency and appetites are far apart at the continental level.
The largest adjustment occurred in mid-2025, when the members of NATO agreed on a new goal: 5 per cent of GDP for defence and security by 2035. That includes 3.5 per cent for core military capabilities such as troops, equipment, and readiness, and an extra 1.5 per cent for infrastructure, cyber defence, and military mobility. Most analysts doubt the goal’s economic or political feasibility, at least for smaller economies. Nevertheless, the message runs clearly: Europe is shifting from token increases to structural reform.
The rationale for this goes beyond economics. The all-out invasion of Ukraine by Russia shattered the delusion that Europe could count indefinitely on geography, diplomacy, or the firepower of America. Security dangers are increasing not only along the periphery but also in the realms of supply lines, energy, cyberspace, and key technological domains. The oft-held hypothesis that the United States will indefinitely subsidise European defence is losing steam. In Brussels, Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw, the speculation is now all about credible deterrence and strategic autonomy.
But more funds do not necessarily add up to more security. Capability does. Many in Europe are ordering large numbers of drones, missile defences, fighter aircraft, and ships. Denmark ordered a new batch of up to 16 F-35s. Germany invested 10 billion dollars in the building of drones. But hardware is only one element of readiness. Resilience, logistics, mobility, and defence industry capacity also need to catch up. Shortfalls in stockpiles, maintenance, and interoperability still undercut deterrence.
The increased expenditure is also generating political tension. Balancing military priorities with welfare obligations is no easy task. In some nations, defence spending will catch up with expenditure on education or healthcare. That will sit uneasily with electorates already strained by inflation, prices, and stagnant incomes. If the rearmament effort is perceived as damaging living standards, the consensus base will shrink. Openness and accountability are essential.
Meanwhile, defence policy is defining the contours of Europe’s personality. The debate is no longer merely how much to spend, but whether to spend. Should Europe aspire to global power projection or focus on regional defence and deterrence? How should it balance emerging threats such as cyberwarfare and robotics? In which domains should it focus? Strategic questions once debated in the shadows are gaining clarity and prominence.
Public awareness and consent are necessary. Rearmament cannot work if people are confused about its aim. Governments have to be transparent about the threats Europe faces and how spending more on defence enhances security. It is not about reverting to Cold War mentality. It is about developing plausible, new deterrence in an age in which military, economic, and online strength are inextricably combined.
There are several things Europe needs to do to make this turnaround reinforce rather than destabilise the continent. First, expenditure needs to be phased and graduated. Jumping suddenly will cause shocks and political backlash. Incremental targets linked with quantifiable capability enhancements will be more sustainable and defensible.
Second, coordination must take priority. Countries must align procurement pipelines, research establishments, and defence infrastructure. Cooperative programmes diminish duplication and foster confidence.
Third, civilian priorities should be preserved. Social programmes should not be deflated by defence budgets. There is a need to balance the budget approach to consider both security and social cohesion. Fourth, security needs to be defined broadly. It covers the realms of cyber defence, energy resilience, disaster preparedness, and key infrastructure.
Fifth, agencies should track and assess progress. Separate oversight, parliamentary scrutiny, and popular participation can help ensure spending delivers outcomes, not leakages or corruption.
Europe’s rearmament is no longer moot; it is a reality. The open issue is whether it is strategic or reactive, coherent or ad hoc, democratic or closed. Done well, it can lay the groundwork for the continent’s long-term stability and strength. Done badly, it can foster resentment, inefficiency, and unforeseen outcomes.
The stakes are high. A secure Europe is more than a military goal; it is a social and political imperative. In an era in which threats are hybrid, alliances are fluid, and public faith is tenuous, the method Europe chooses to construct its defence stance will determine more than its preparedness. It will determine its future.
The writer works in search & advertising at Microsoft Ireland, with a master’s degree in business and computer science. The author can be reached at atif@live.ie.
