Syed Muhammad Uzzam Kazmi
KP is facing a worsening security crisis, yet its provincial government remains deeply focused on street protests, political marches, and partisan battles. The contrast is hard to ignore. While police officers are systematically targeted, terrorist attacks surge, and anti-terror capabilities fall short, the provincial leadership continues to spend its energy on political campaigns, treating the protection of its citizens as a second priority.
The debate over whether KP faces a severe security problem is over. The numbers make that clear. Police deaths rose from 63 in the first half of 2025 to 122 in the first half of 2026, a 93.7 per cent increase. Police injuries doubled from 84 to 175. Terrorist attacks jumped from 508 to 680 between January and September 2026, representing a 33.9 per cent surge. KP recorded 174 terrorist attacks in 2023, 295 in 2024, and 413 in 2025. Sohail Afridi’s political party has governed KP for over a decade. They have held provincial power throughout this entire rise in violence, making it impossible to pass the blame or pretend this is a brand-new problem.
The real question is not what Afridi inherited, but why a party with more than a decade of rule in KP still refuses to focus on the security crisis in front of it.
CTD shows the clear gap between government announcements and real-world readiness. In December 2025, the government approved Rs 7.77 billion for equipment and revived a Rs 4.30 billion project for district offices. Against 3,844 sanctioned positions, only 3,113 were filled, leaving a 19 per cent vacancy rate. The department had just 17 bulletproof vehicles, compared to 76 in Punjab and 42 in Balochistan. Only nine M4 rifles were available against a required 200, while night-vision devices stood at 11 against a requirement of 35.
This is the difference between approving funds on paper and actually building capacity on the ground. For a province facing persistent terrorism, budget approvals mean nothing if officers on the frontlines lack the equipment and manpower needed to do their jobs.
The consequences of this gap have been costly. Repeated attacks across Tank, Bajaur, Kohat and Hangu exposed the constant vulnerabilities faced by local police posts. July checkpoint attack in Tank killed 15 people, including 12 soldiers and two police officers. Days later, an attack in Hangu claimed 11 police officers. In August, a bombing near a police station in Swat killed 17 people and injured 34. In September, a major police complex in Kohat housing endured a 20-hour assault.
When key police and intelligence facilities remain vulnerable to multi-hour attacks, it reveals an urgent need for better preparation, defence, and quick-response measures.
The government’s timelines highlight a clear problem with priorities. Chief Minister Afridi waited 112 days after taking office to hold his first Apex Committee meeting. While officials sat around tables issuing promises, attacks continued across the province. A meeting is not an achievement simply because it happened, and a budget allocation is not operational readiness until an officer actually receives the armour, weapons, and vehicles required to survive.
This raises serious questions about executive focus. Just three days after the 20-hour Kohat police complex attack, the Chief Minister held a major press conference. Instead of addressing security failures or CTD shortages, the event focused on organising a political march to Islamabad. While political mobilisation is a regular part of party politics, prioritising it right after a major security failure shows a clear misalignment of duties.
At the same time, the administration has sought greater political authority over the police. In February, the government defended political control over senior police postings. In September, the cabinet approved draft legislation expanding the Chief Minister’s influence over senior appointments and the Police Policy Board.
Effective anti-terror operations require professional independence and merit-based leadership. Increasing political control over police appointments risks weakening the chain of command at the exact moment operational strength is needed most.
Furthermore, the security challenge extends beyond terrorism into organised crime. During the first three months of 2026, police registered 7,771 narcotics cases, seizing 5.6 tons of hashish, 847 kilograms of methamphetamine, 210 kilograms of heroin, and 275 kilograms of opium. Yet, the province reached only 52 per cent of its annual target for drug crop reduction after ten fiscal months. The interdiction of a massive 960-kilogram drug consignment in Peshawar, along with raids on drug labs inside the capital, shows that illegal networks are operating on a commercial scale. Combined with Customs seizing Rs 1.163 billion worth of contraband in just two weeks, the data points to an expanding illegal economy that destabilises the province.
After more than a decade in power, the ruling party cannot continue to treat KP’s security crisis as an inherited burden or a distraction from politics. Protest marches and rallies may gather crowds, but they do not protect police posts, supply equipment, or dismantle criminal networks. The provincial government must shift its focus from political campaigns to practical administration. Until political authority is matched by real delivery on the ground, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s security environment will continue to deteriorate, and the frontline officers will pay the highest price. KP does not need another spectacle of political confrontation while its police force buries its dead. It needs a government capable of turning state authority into actual protection, and the numbers are demanding an answer.
The writer is a freelance columnist.
