Najm us Saqib
Five days before India’s Secretary of Water Resources expressly announced the decision to keep the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance, it was suggested in this space, on 19 April, that Pakistan should ‘revisit the IWT and evaluate our options.’ In the same article entitled Indus Waters Treaty, it was lamented that ‘in the hullabaloo of the ongoing political uncertainty, economic recovery initiatives, and hosting several visits of IMF teams to Pakistan, no one seems to have time to realise that a much bigger issue is quietly brewing in the melting pot of Pak-India relations.’ Explaining that ‘the ensuing transboundary water dispute will have the potential of causing a severe drought in Pakistan that might compel Pakistan to get embroiled in an utterly undesirable predicament,’ Islamabad’s attention was drawn to the ‘heightened tensions’ which were ‘just around the corner.’
Indeed, the latest Indian move was expected. It was neither a knee-jerk reaction nor a response to the Pahalgam incident. It was a well-thought-out, pre-conceived strategic move to achieve certain ‘long overdue’ strategic objectives—namely making the disputed territory of Jammu & Kashmir a part of the Indian Union in August 2019; revoking or withdrawing from the IWT, thereby choking Pakistan; and making claims over the territory of Azad Jammu & Kashmir. The coming months are expected to see the last phase of the strategy taking shape, culminating in further tensions between the two South Asian nuclear powers—even if the ongoing war hysteria dissipates.
Frustrated by its failure to suppress the ongoing separatist movements and the three-decade-old indigenous freedom struggle in its occupied Kashmir, and to establish Pakistan’s alleged role in causing continual headaches, India was looking for a pretext to tamper with the Treaty. Pakistan’s restraint on India’s provocative overtures—such as the ‘accidental’ firing of a cruise missile—failed to provide India with any plausible raison d’être to do so. Hence, India decided to make Pahalgam the pretext for suspending the IWT, knowing full well that any such announcement could end up destabilising an already volatile region—and subsequently bring the two South Asian nuclear powers dangerously close to the brink of a devastating war. Considering India’s recent pronouncements, such as its operations in Canada and the US, one must not rule out any similar ‘adventures’. Unfortunately, the ‘Rising India’ seems to have no boundaries anymore. Pakistan must be prepared for any untoward incident…!!
As the IWT’s suspension required serious consideration, the following day the National Security Council (NSC) decided to explore all avenues provided by the Treaty through its Dispute Resolution Mechanism—including, but not limited to, approaching the World Bank and the Permanent Indus Commission, and seeking the establishment of a Court of Arbitration. Applying the principle of reciprocity, Pakistan had no choice but to initiate the usual tit-for-tat measures. For the sake of clarification, Islamabad may note that, as such, the IWT has neither been revoked nor has India withdrawn from it unilaterally. For all practical purposes, the IWT is still in place. It has simply been kept in abeyance by India—a step the Treaty does not warrant. Secondly, instead of issuing charged statements and unnecessarily responding to the Indian media’s war-mongering, efforts could be made to understand how many years—and billions—it would take for India to possess the requisite infrastructural capacity to divert waters. Pakistan must respond proportionately without jumping to hurried conclusions. There is no need to cross a bridge that is not even conceived yet.
Yes, the situation will dramatically change if India launches a full-fledged attack. An important reminder…!!! Any war suspends all bilateral agreements ipso facto.
The 1948 ‘insurgency’ in Kashmir was followed by a severe drought in Pakistan as India cut off its water supply. Nine years of relentless efforts produced the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), demarcating the control and distribution of waters between the two South Asian nascent states. The most worrisome aspect in 2025 is Pakistan’s continued naivety towards the IWT’s so-called solid legal base. The notion that India will not be able to revoke the Treaty unilaterally, or an unrealistic reliance on the Treaty’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism, are perhaps not good enough reasons for complacency. The wake-up call given by India through its formal notice regarding the IWT’s future and its subsequent suspension demands a foolproof long-term strategy. With diplomacy and mediation denied their role, any bilateral talks to defuse the tense situation remain elusive. Right now, it is an open-ended situation, and knowing PM Modi, it could take any untoward turn.
History has proved that India would, somehow, always have its way of going about the IWT even if a decision on any related dispute did not go in its favour. For instance, the Treaty barred India from building large dams that would disrupt Pakistan’s supply. India was allowed only run-of-the-river projects for limited irrigation—and that too, only for ‘existing uses.’ Over the years, Islamabad has accused New Delhi of violating the IWT and building dams that would reduce the flow of water to Pakistan. In 1992, India conceived the Baglihar Dam, a run-of-the-river hydroelectric power project on the Chenab River.
The writer is a former Ambassador of Pakistan and author of eight books in three languages. He can be reached at najmussaqib1960@msn.com
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