Yasir Khan
The Supreme Court’s ruling on National Accountability Bureau cases gives operative meaning to the latest stage of Pakistan’s judicial restructuring. The jurisdictional change examined by the Court flows principally from the 27th Constitutional Amendment-which created the Federal Constitutional Court-and the National Accountability Bureau (Amendment) Act, 2026.
The case arose from a bail petition, but the question before the Court was wider. After Parliament inserted Section 32A into the National Accountability Ordinance, could the Supreme Court continue to hear NAB appeals, petitions for leave to appeal and connected bail matters?
Reading Article 175F(1)(a) of the Constitution with Sections 32 and 32A of the NAB law, the Court held that it could no longer exercise appellate jurisdiction over such proceedings. Pending NAB appeals and bail-related petitions before the Supreme Court must consequently be transferred to the Federal Constitutional Court.
This does not mean that every NAB proceeding will now begin and end before the FCC. Accountability courts retain their trial jurisdiction, while High Courts remain the first appellate forum under Section 32. What Section 32A creates is a statutory second appeal to the FCC against decisions made by High Courts under the accountability law.
The reasoning rests on a basic constitutional proposition. Courts do not possess an undefined reservoir of authority. Their jurisdiction must come from the Constitution or legislation. Article 175 states that no court may exercise jurisdiction except that conferred upon it by the Constitution or by law.
Article 175F(1)(a), meanwhile, permits the FCC to hear appeals from High Court judgments, orders or sentences where an Act of Parliament so provides. Section 32A supplies that statutory authority in accountability cases.
Previously, an aggrieved party ordinarily approached the Supreme Court through a petition seeking discretionary leave to appeal. The amended framework replaces that route with a statutory second appeal. The judgment accordingly describes Section 32A as beneficial and remedial: the availability of the additional appellate forum no longer depends upon first persuading the Supreme Court to grant leave.
Section 32A does not separately use the word “bail”, leading to the argument that the Supreme Court might retain jurisdiction over bail petitions even after the principal appeal had shifted to the FCC.
The Court rejected that division. Its reasoning applies both to bail sought by under-trial prisoners and to post-conviction matters involving suspension of sentence or release during the pendency of an appeal. Bail and interim relief cannot be separated artificially from the jurisdiction governing the principal proceedings.
When the law confers appellate jurisdiction, it also carries the ancillary powers required to make that jurisdiction effective. The court hearing the substantive matter must be able to decide questions concerning custody, bail, suspension of sentence and related interim relief.
Any other arrangement would allow the FCC to determine the main appeal while the Supreme Court separately controlled the accused person’s custody. Such fragmentation could produce parallel proceedings, conflicting orders and uncertainty over which court possessed effective authority over the case.
The ruling also clarifies the position of pending proceedings. Criminal petitions for leave to appeal, admitted appeals against conviction or acquittal and petitions arising from High Court bail orders under the NAB law stand transferred to the FCC by operation of law.
The amendment applies to pending cases because it creates a procedural and beneficial appellate remedy. It does not, however, disturb cases that have already been finally decided. That distinction protects concluded litigation while ensuring that pending proceedings follow the newly prescribed appellate route.
A person released on bail remains in custodia legis-in the custody of the law-and continues to be bound by the authority of the court through bail conditions and sureties. The power to regulate that custody must therefore belong to the forum exercising jurisdiction over the substantive proceedings.
The judgment also rejects the suggestion that the Supreme Court has “surrendered” its authority. Jurisdiction is not a matter of institutional prestige or judicial preference. Judicial independence requires courts to exercise the powers given to them fearlessly; it does not permit them to retain powers that the Constitution or Parliament has assigned elsewhere.
An order made by a court without lawful jurisdiction is coram non judice and void. By recognising the limits of its authority, the Supreme Court has not weakened the rule of law. It has affirmed one of its most elementary requirements: every court, including the highest court, must act within the jurisdiction conferred upon it.
The writer is a freelance columnist.
