Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s pledge to use the “full force of the state” after 19 soldiers were martyred in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa captured the nation’s grief and defiance, and for that he deserves credit. His words reflected the public mood. Yet, they also fit a tragic pattern: each time soldiers fall, vows of resolve are made, operations are announced, but the broader drift continues.
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has regained momentum, executing increasingly lethal attacks and rebuilding networks in the tribal belt. This is not the result of a sudden surge but of sustained space to regroup. The most damaging misstep was the decision in 2021-22 to pursue talks with the TTP. Brokered by the Afghan Taliban, the truce allowed fighters to return to Swat and Waziristan, consolidate their presence, and prepare for renewed violence. The collapse of those negotiations left Pakistan more vulnerable than before.
Equally costly has been our misplaced confidence in Kabul. For years, “strategic depth” was treated as a buffer against chaos on our western flank. Instead, the Taliban’s return to Kabul has coincided with a surge of attacks inside Pakistan. The ties between the two groups are rooted in shared ideology and years of combat partnership. Appeals to act against the TTP have produced little more than denial. Isn’t it high time that Pakistan realises it cannot afford to base its security on expectations of Taliban goodwill?
Our armed forces continue to carry the brunt of this burden with bravery. But its sacrifices must be matched by political clarity. Selective counterterrorism wherein some groups are pursued to the last man while others are ignored or even indulged because of politics, ideology, or geography, has left the state compromised and the militants confident. There is no room left for such distinctions. Every armed group challenging the writ of the state is the enemy. Anything less is self-defeating.
The prime minister’s statement matters. It signals intent. But intent without a credible line of action is noise. Nothing more. Pakistan needs a doctrine anchored in three principles: no negotiations under fire, no tolerance of sanctuaries across the border, and no political indulgence for militants at home. This requires sustained operations backed by intelligence, a diplomatic strategy that mobilises regional partners, and the willingness to use pressure where appeals have failed.
Fires raging across the length and breadth of the motherland are not only a reminder of militant brutality. They are also an indictment of a counter-terrorism posture that has relied too heavily on words and too little on consistency. If this moment is to mean more than another cycle of vows and funerals, it must mark the point at which Pakistan replaces routine with resolve, and drift with direction.
