Dr. Yaqoob Ahmad
The discourse on creating new provinces in Pakistan has moved from the margins to the mainstream. From seminars at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute to fiery speeches in the National Assembly, the question is no longer if administrative restructuring is needed, but how and when. With proposals ranging from carving out a South Punjab province to creating 27 smaller units, the debate encapsulates the nation’s struggle with governance, identity, and federalism. This analysis examines the arguments systematically: the advantages, the constitutional hurdles, the challenges, and the governance models that could shape Pakistan’s future.
Pakistan’s population has now surpassed 241 million according to the 2023 census, with estimates nearing 250 million, yet the country is governed by only four provinces. Punjab alone accounts for roughly 127.7 million people—over half the national total. Demands for units such as South Punjab (Saraikistan, covering Multan, Bahawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan divisions) and Hazara in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa stem from administrative distance, uneven development, cultural identity, and the desire for more responsive governance.
Proponents argue that creating new provinces is a viable solution to Pakistan’s governance crisis. Punjab’s massive population—larger than many countries—renders its governance complex and inefficient. Smaller administrative units can bring government closer to citizens, reducing bureaucratic delays and improving service delivery on issues like roads, streets, and sewerage—the primary concerns citizens raise with their representatives. Residents of southern Punjab often travel long distances to Lahore for official work; smaller units can bring decision-making, health, education, and justice services closer to citizens, improving responsiveness and accountability.
The demand for South Punjab is rooted in a “sense of deprivation,” with politicians decrying discriminatory resource allocation—contrasting only three development schemes for the region against 40 for Lahore. Southern Punjab contributes substantially to agriculture (cotton, wheat, mangoes) yet has historically received lower per-capita development spending and faces higher multidimensional poverty. A dedicated province could prioritise local needs, industrial zones, universities, and infrastructure. Hazara’s hydropower (Tarbela), tourism, and industrial potential could similarly receive focused attention. The Hazara movement seeks to escape what it perceives as neglect by the Pashtun-majority Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government. New provinces are seen as a remedy for decades of political and economic exclusion.
Smaller federating units would ensure more equitable resource distribution through a reformed National Finance Commission (NFC) Award, breaking the concentration of wealth and power in provincial capitals. New provinces would increase regional voice in the Senate and National Assembly, reduce the dominance of existing provincial capitals, and recognise distinct linguistic and cultural identities (Saraiki, Hindko) without undermining the federation. This aligns with the spirit of the 18th Amendment’s devolution. Manageable units can improve policing, disaster response, and planning. Comparative examples—India’s state reorganisation and Indonesia’s expansion from 8 to 38 provinces—show that more units can strengthen administration when paired with clear fiscal rules. Punjab’s population weight creates imbalances; smaller units could ease inter-provincial tensions and promote inclusive federalism.
The constitutional process for creating new provinces is deliberately rigorous, reflecting the gravity of altering Pakistan’s federal structure. Under Article 239, altering provincial limits requires a constitutional amendment. A bill must secure a two-thirds majority in both the National Assembly and the Senate. Crucially, Article 239(4) mandates that such a bill must also be passed by the Provincial Assembly of the affected province by a two-thirds majority. This gives the existing province a de facto veto. Legal experts estimate that establishing new provinces would require amending at least 12 articles of the Constitution, including Article 1 (defining Pakistan’s territories), Articles 51 and 59 (adjusting National Assembly and Senate seat allocations), and Article 106 (defining the composition of the new Provincial Assembly). There is speculation that the government may seek to delete or amend Article 239(4) to bypass provincial consent—a move that would face severe political and legal backlash. Some recent discussions have floated ideas to adjust the process via a potential 28th Amendment, but any such change would itself require the same high thresholds and broad consensus.
Despite the theoretical advantages, the path to new provinces is fraught with obstacles. The single greatest challenge is the lack of political consensus. Regional political elites view new provinces as a threat to their influence and power base. Parties often support new provinces where they gain electorally and resist where they lose influence—the PPP, a key coalition partner, has a contradictory stance, supporting a South Punjab province but opposing any division of Sindh, even passing a provincial assembly resolution against it.
As PPP leader Nayyar Bukhari noted, any constitutional amendment requires the government’s coalition partners, making PPP support indispensable.
Creating a new province also comes with a staggering financial cost. Each new unit would require a Governor, Chief Minister, cabinet, provincial assembly, High Court, public service commissions, Senate seats, and an entire bureaucracy. Constructing new provincial capitals, assemblies, secretariats, and high courts requires substantial initial capital investment and ongoing operational costs.
Analysts warn that taxpayers would bear the burden of financing this entire administrative apparatus. Claims of large savings—such as Rs 318 billion annually—are contested; historically, new tiers have expanded bureaucracy. Smaller units may lose economies of scale for major infrastructure. Given Pakistan’s ailing economy, this is a critical constraint.
Furthermore, the 7th NFC Award (still operative) gives provinces 57.5% of the divisible pool, with horizontal shares based on population, poverty, revenue generation, and inverse density. New provinces would create additional claims, necessitating renegotiation. Water apportionment under the 1991 Accord (tied to four provinces) would also require fresh rules—particularly complex for Punjab’s interconnected canal system. Dividing existing assets, water-sharing rights, and provincial revenues presents complex inter-regional negotiation hurdles. Drawing boundaries primarily on linguistic or ethnic lines could intensify identity politics or create new minorities within the new units. Transitioning bureaucracy, assets, and institutions is complex; past partial steps (civil secretariats in Multan and Bahawalpur) have lacked full autonomy.
Several governance models have been proposed, each with different implications. A recurrent proposal is to convert Pakistan’s existing 36 administrative divisions into provinces, or revert to the original 12 divisions of erstwhile West Pakistan. This model leverages existing administrative boundaries, potentially reducing transition costs and complexity. Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has endorsed this approach, suggesting using “36 divisions” as a ready-made framework for devolution. A more nuanced proposal suggests creating economic-functional provinces that align with distinct economic clusters (industrial cities, agrarian belts, trade corridors) while political provinces continue to manage identity and representation. This framework aims to make provinces function as economies rather than political fiefdoms.
A consensus is emerging that administrative restructuring should not be treated as a binary choice between new provinces or maintaining the status quo. Instead, it must be pursued alongside three complementary reforms: genuine local government empowerment (as mandated by Article 140-A), fiscal devolution through a three-tier NFC formula distributing resources among federal, provincial, and local governments, and institutional reform to change entrenched bureaucratic and political culture. Successful new provinces would need a coherent design beyond mere boundary changes—clear rules on residuary powers and the Fourth Schedule, performance indicators incentivising revenue effort and service delivery, and fixed election calendars, transparent budgeting, and independent oversight to prevent elite capture.
Realistic pathways exist if pursued carefully. South Punjab (or dual Multan and Bahawalpur provinces) and Hazara have the strongest political and institutional backing, including past provincial assembly resolutions and parliamentary bills. These could serve as models before broader reorganisation. Proposals range from 12 to 15 provinces (dividing each existing province into three, or elevating major divisions) to more ambitious schemes of 20 to 32 units. A transparent national commission, grounded in data and cross-party dialogue, could assess population, revenue base, geographic contiguity, cultural coherence, and fiscal sustainability before any map-drawing. Strengthening local governments first (or in parallel) under Article 140-A, then creating provinces only where clear viability and demand exist, offers a phased approach. International models emphasise performance-based fiscal transfers and strong third-tier governance.
The creation of new provinces in Pakistan is not merely an administrative exercise; it is a fundamental re-imagining of the federation. The advantages are clear: improved governance, reduced marginalisation, and more equitable development. The challenges are equally formidable: political resistance, fiscal costs, and constitutional rigour. The path forward lies not in haste but in deliberation. As participants at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) debate concluded, any reform should be informed by constitutional requirements, public demand, fiscal sustainability, administrative capacity, and its impact on service delivery. The consensus achieved on a South Punjab province could serve as a starting point, a test case for building broader agreement. However, without simultaneously strengthening local governments and devolving power to the grassroots, new provinces alone will not solve Pakistan’s governance crisis. The debate must be organic, evidence-based, and inclusive—because the future of Pakistan’s federation depends on it.
The writer is a public policy researcher and can be reached at yaqoob.muhmand@gmail.com
