Malik M. Ashraf
Currently, a debate is raging regarding the 27th Constitutional Amendment. Reportedly, the proposed amendment seeks to address structural issues of the state by creating a constitutional court; resolving the issue of judicial rotation; carrying out reforms in the Election Commission; restoring executive magistracy; ensuring a federal role in education; recalibrating fiscal policy; enabling federal oversight on population; and promoting joint-ness and synergy for national security.
Critics say that the proposed amendment is tantamount to rolling back provincial autonomy and concentrating power in the federation. Chairman of PTI, Barrister Gohar Khan, has even raised questions about the moral authority of the current parliament to make amendments to the constitution. I will not touch upon the subject of the legitimacy of the current parliament to amend the constitution or otherwise, nor dilate on political comments, but will remain confined to giving my opinion on the envisaged changes.
Pakistan undoubtedly stands at a crossroads. Over the past two decades, due to multiple institutional reforms perceived to democratise governance, devolve power, and strengthen provincial autonomy, the machinery of the state has become increasingly fragmented, dysfunctional, slow, and inconsistent, scuttling its ability to cope with challenges that have eroded efficiency and public trust.
The move to create a constitutional court stems from the reality of a backlog of about 2.2 million cases nationwide for a long period. The judiciary today is handling everything from property disputes to constitutional crises under one institutional roof. This merger has overloaded the courts and blurred the focus on quick justice. It is said justice delayed is justice denied.
The Supreme Court, instead of interpreting the constitution, spends much of its time hearing appeals on routine civil and criminal matters. High Courts are similarly burdened by petitions under Articles 199 and 184(3), many of which are administrative grievances rather than constitutional questions.
The creation of a constitutional court will strengthen the separation between ordinary and constitutional jurisdictions, allowing the Supreme Court to focus on the uniform interpretation of law while ensuring faster and more credible protection of fundamental rights. The proposal for the creation of a constitutional court is not unprecedented. This arrangement exists in Germany, Austria, Spain, Moldova, South Korea, Turkey, Colombia, South Africa, Guatemala, and Myanmar. These specialised courts focus exclusively on constitutional issues, separating them from the general court system.
Rotation and transfer of judges from one court to another are justified by the fact that judges who remain stationed in one district for years can form informal ties with local lawyers, police, or elites, risking partiality. Uneven caseloads across districts further strain the system. The amendment seeks merit-based policies that would ensure neutrality, disrupt entrenched interests, and balance workloads across districts. The likely reintroduction of executive magistrates is also necessary to restore local order and efficiency. Pakistan’s justice system is paralysed by backlog and inefficiency. Traffic violations, petty offences, and local disputes clog courts that should focus on serious matters. Before 2001, all these cases were handled by executive magistrates. Their abolition under the Devolution Plan removed a critical layer of local order and preventive justice. The UK and France have executive magistrates to deal with such issues.
The Election Commission has invariably been subjected to strong criticism by parties losing elections. Under the current system, the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition must agree on nominees, a formula that often leads to prolonged deadlocks, leaving the ECP incomplete and election schedules uncertain. Therefore, there is a need to depoliticise the ECP, ensuring that appointments are made through consensus and merit, not political bargaining. A strong, impartial Election Commission is vital for credible democracy and peaceful transitions of power.
Education defines a nation’s identity and competitiveness. The transfer of education to the provinces under the 18th Amendment has fractured the education system of Pakistan. The provinces now have separate curricula. This decentralisation has caused duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources. The absence of a common national curriculum has weakened national cohesion and widened resource disparities. The 27th Amendment seeks to re-establish a federal role in education policy, ensuring a standardised national curriculum grounded in shared civic values and equal learning opportunities across provinces.
The need for correcting the fiscal imbalance of the NFC Award stems from the fact that the distribution of resources between the federation and the provinces has unintentionally created fiscal distortions. The federation’s fiscal space has shrunk, limiting its ability to invest in national infrastructure, defence, and development projects. Under the current award, 57% of federal revenues go to the provinces. The 27th Amendment aims to rebalance fiscal responsibilities, enabling the federal government to correct structural disincentives, promote fiscal responsibility, and align resource distribution.
Population growth at 2.5% is arguably the biggest debilitating factor affecting GDP growth. After the 18th Amendment, population welfare became a provincial subject, resulting in fragmented policies and inconsistent data. Federal institutions such as the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS) lack the authority to enforce unified targets or coordinate family planning goals. The circumstances dictate federal oversight, enabling a national demographic dashboard integrating provincial data, standardised benchmarks, and incentives for provinces. Lastly, it aims at aligning population policy with national development and SDGs.
The most important envisaged change concerns promoting joint-ness and synergy in the armed forces. Modern warfare has transformed from isolated battles fought on land, sea, or air into multi-domain operations (MDOs) that depend on synchronisation of effects, where intelligence, technology, and narrative control converge to shape the outcome. In this interconnected battlespace, victory hinges on speed, unity of purpose, and institutional coordination. War is now as much about data, perception, and systems integration as it is about tanks or aircraft.
Pakistan’s own experience during recent crises demonstrated effective but ad hoc synergy across its national instruments of power—military, diplomatic, and informational. However, this success was driven largely by strong military leadership with absolute strategic clarity rather than systemic structures. Such personality-based joint-ness is temporary; only institutionalised mechanisms can ensure continuity and resilience.
As is evident from the foregoing, the 27th Constitutional Amendment is not about rolling back provincial rights or concentrating power in the federation. It is about restoring functional balance where fragmentation has crippled performance. Each proposed reform targets a real and measurable dysfunction. Pakistan’s constitutional structure must evolve to meet the complexity of the 21st century by bringing coherence where division now reigns. The 27th Amendment offers a path to structuring a smarter, stronger, and more coordinated state that delivers justice, equity, and order for all its citizens.
The writer is a freelance columnist. He can be reached at ashpak10@gmail.com
