Sajjad Ahmad Khan
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit being held in China has captured international attention, not only for the scale of its participants but also for the moment in history it represents. Formed in 2001, building on the earlier “Shanghai Five” mechanism of the mid-1990s, the SCO was initially focused on managing border security and combating terrorism. Two decades later, it has grown into a regional powerhouse, encompassing major nuclear states, vast energy resources, and nearly half of the world’s population. The transformation of a modest regional pact into a global forum tells the story of how Asia, once viewed as peripheral to international governance, is steadily taking center stage.
The timing and venue of this summit add symbolic weight. China’s role as host underscores its determination to anchor itself as the hub of Eurasian diplomacy and economic cooperation. As tensions mount between Beijing and Washington, and as Moscow grapples with sanctions and isolation from the West, the SCO is positioning itself as an alternative order—one that promises dialogue on the basis of mutual respect rather than Western conditionality. This context alone makes the current summit far more than a routine diplomatic gathering; it is, in many ways, a rehearsal for a multipolar world.
Security, once the SCO’s sole preoccupation, still lies at the heart of the organization’s mission. The collective emphasis on combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism reflects the shared vulnerabilities of its members. For Russia, this resonates with the threat of militancy in the North Caucasus. For China, concerns extend to Xinjiang and the potential spillover of instability from Afghanistan. Pakistan and India, too, bring to the table their experiences of cross-border terrorism and insurgencies. The SCO thus functions as a platform where countries that often struggle to cooperate bilaterally can at least agree on the need for stability and intelligence coordination.
But beyond security, the SCO has matured into a forum of economic significance. Central Asia, often described as the “heart of Eurasia,” lies at the crossroads of energy pipelines, transport corridors, and digital connectivity projects. China’s Belt and Road Initiative dovetails neatly with the SCO framework, and the summit provides an opportunity to align ambitious infrastructure plans with regional needs. Russia, under sanctions, is eager to deepen its trade with Asian partners, while Pakistan and India, both energy-hungry economies, see in the SCO a route to secure supplies of oil, gas, and electricity. In this respect, the SCO is not just a diplomatic forum but also a potential energy community in the making.
Afghanistan, though not a full member, looms large over SCO discussions. Since the U.S. withdrawal in 2021, the country has been at the center of both hopes and anxieties. For SCO states, Afghanistan is both a security challenge—given the risk of militant groups finding safe haven—and an economic opportunity, as a potential transit hub linking South Asia with Central Asia. The SCO, unlike Western forums, has direct stakes in Afghanistan’s future, making it uniquely positioned to encourage stability while exploring routes of cooperation with the Taliban authorities.
Another layer of conversation emerging at the summit is the digital economy. In an era where technological rivalry is shaping global politics, SCO states are seeking ways to strengthen digital connectivity, e-commerce, and financial cooperation without over-reliance on Western-controlled systems. Proposals for alternative payment mechanisms, enhanced cyber cooperation, and regional innovation hubs suggest that the SCO is no longer just thinking in terms of physical infrastructure but also in terms of digital sovereignty.
Cultural and educational linkages, while often overshadowed by grand geopolitical narratives, remain a vital strand of SCO’s agenda. The summit underscores the need for people-to-people contacts, ranging from student exchanges to tourism development. By fostering a sense of shared cultural identity across Eurasia, the SCO is attempting to soften its image from being merely a geopolitical counterweight to the West, into a genuine community of shared destiny. These softer initiatives may not generate headlines, but they cultivate trust among societies that are otherwise separated by language, history, and politics.
For Pakistan, the SCO offers both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, the organization gives Islamabad access to regional energy markets, transport corridors, and a platform to deepen ties with China and Russia. On the other, the presence of India complicates Pakistan’s diplomatic maneuvering, as bilateral tensions often spill into multilateral settings. Nonetheless, Pakistan views the SCO as central to its foreign policy diversification, offering a way to reduce dependence on Western forums and to situate itself firmly within Eurasian dynamics.
India, meanwhile, walks a delicate line. Its membership reflects its desire not to be left out of Eurasia’s emerging architecture, but its growing closeness with the United States and participation in the Quad sometimes raise questions about its commitment to SCO’s deeper integration. How India balances its dual roles—as both a Western partner and a Eurasian stakeholder—remains one of the organization’s most intriguing dynamics.
Challenges, however, remain formidable. The SCO’s diversity is both its strength and its weakness. While it brings together countries of different political systems, economic models, and security concerns, these same differences often prevent the group from acting with coherence. The rivalry between India and Pakistan, the cautious mistrust between Russia and China, and the economic disparities among Central Asian states all limit the organization’s effectiveness. Critics argue that SCO declarations often sound ambitious but fall short in terms of implementation.
And yet, to dismiss the SCO as ineffective would be to miss the larger point. The organization reflects the realignment of global power away from a unipolar order dominated by the West toward a more multipolar world. It gives voice to countries often marginalized in Western forums, allowing them to articulate their visions for security, economic integration, and cultural cooperation on their own terms. The SCO may not yet rival NATO or the European Union in terms of institutional depth, but its growing influence is undeniable.
As this summit in China concludes, the world will be watching less for its declarations and more for the direction it signals. If its members can move beyond their rivalries and translate rhetoric into action, the SCO could evolve into a cornerstone of Eurasia’s future. It embodies both the promise and the difficulty of building cooperation in a fragmented world—messy, imperfect, and often contradictory, yet reflective of the realities of the 21st century.
