Zulfiqar Ali Shirazi
Observing the power swing taking place on the world stage keenly today makes one consider a concoction of laws of physics on momentum and energy to brew yet another one defining this swing. It can go like this: power can be created but cannot be destroyed, as it can change hands and flex, both subtly. This very much underlines the prevailing scenario, as the USA unleashes a war, rattles the global economy, strains old alliances, and treats settled norms as inconveniences. On its heels, the option with the least odds emerges, enabling the rival-in-chief to seize power and the moment. That’s what China has been at work on all the while, without any rhetoric, without any denunciation of Washington in thunderous terms. And in doing so, China never announced itself as an alternative. The focus, the silence tells all.
China’s indifference to the USA’s wars of the past few decades has now changed into a different feeling of worry and concern. It, in fact, frets over the prevailing unpredictability, and Chinese analysts seem to be bewildered by American policy. This surprise has reasons. China needs oil and gas that moves through the Gulf. Its growth depends on open sea lanes, working markets, and economic stability. Chinese leadership reckons that America is dragging the world back to the law of the jungle. That is not a moral complaint but a strategic worry, as China views replacing the USA as the Gulf’s military guarantor as a costly endeavour and therefore prefers a subtler path.
In the Middle East (ME), China aims to loosen the ties that bind the Gulf to Washington, and it seems Washington is doing much of that work itself. Gulf leaders watched the US wage this war, in chaotic fashion, careless of the damage to their cities and economies. The region is now splitting. The United Arab Emirates leans toward Israel and Washington. A larger group led by Saudi Arabia, and including Qatar, Oman and even Turkey, wants something else. It wants to keep American ties while opening dialogue with Iran and deepening links to China. This hedged order is what Beijing may prefer.
The evidence is on the table. In 2023, China brokered the restoration of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Riyadh has since resisted American technology projects, bought Chinese missiles and drones, exercised with the Chinese navy, and explored co-venturing production of combat drones at home. From 2016 through 2025, Gulf states purchased more than three-quarters of Chinese arms sold to the region. No one is tearing down the American umbrella, but for sure they are looking for options, and with every sweep and scan, the American leverage erodes.
The larger success for China is economic, and it defies expectation. China imports about 70 per cent of its oil, and a war in the Gulf should hurt it badly, but it did not. Why so? Because Beijing spent years preparing. It diversified suppliers. It built what may be the world’s largest oil stockpile. It leaned on coal, expanded nuclear power, and electrified its economy on a scale no rival has matched; about 30 per cent of energy consumption, well above the Western figures. In 2024 China installed more than half of all new wind and solar capacity on earth. When the war hit, it simply fell back to home-grown alternatives- bought less oil, cutting imports by around four million barrels a day.
Claiming “home-grown alternatives” is supported by available data. As the world scrambled to build solar farms, batteries, wind turbines, electric fleets, and modern grids, China already had made the most of it. It controls roughly 91 per cent of solar panel manufacturing and 89 per cent of lithium battery capacity. It supplies most of the world’s electric vehicles and builds at least 70 per cent of nearly every clean energy technology worth tracking. This is a pattern and not a one-off thing; earlier in this decade, the pandemic made China the world’s leading medical equipment supplier. The AI boom made it the source of the metals, cooling systems, and components that data centres cannot run without. The longer energy insecurity lasts, the world looks for alternatives whose industries China owns and leverages.
There is a quieter front too. China aspires to make renminbi a global reserve currency, and is building the bond markets accordingly and offering a real alternative to dollarisation. During the war, Iran reportedly let some tankers pass only if buyers paid in renminbi or crypto. China and its partners keep expanding trade settled outside the dollar to circumvent American sanctions. The move is gradual, but in the desired direction.History
Then there is the matter of reputation. USA entered this war promising regime change, a destroyed nuclear program, and the end of Iran’s missiles and proxies, but none can be fully achieved or confirmed. The initiation of war itself threw a new challenge at the USA to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, which was open before the war. The cost of war has been immense so far, denominated by billions of dollars spent, scarce munitions, pulled-away assets from ME, and rattled allies. China did almost nothing. It kept buying Iranian oil, held its Gulf relationships, and paid nothing to defend Iran or police the Gulf. The Chinese muted response had a method about it; avoiding dramatic confrontation, but steady accumulation of influence.
To weigh it up, for the last quarter of a century, the USA has embroiled itself in ME wars while China kept working on its economic gains. Washington acted, or reacted- whatever the case may be- while Beijing carefully calibrated its responses, regardless of the cost incurred in the form of higher energy prices or disrupted trade. It will not be an overstatement that Beijing stands out as a major beneficiary of American wars in the ME. If the waging of war trends by the USA remain unabated, the power pendulum swinging silently, as of now, may finally stall at the Chinese extreme.Geographic Reference
