Two-Nation Theory and Pakistan-Bangladesh

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Ali Anwar

The Two-Nation Theory has long been the most contested idea to emerge from the political history of the subcontinent. Its critics have repeatedly declared it obsolete, defeated, or buried under the weight of subsequent events. Yet history has a way of resurfacing truths that power politics tries to suppress. In recent years, Bangladesh’s renewed assertion of its sovereign identity, free from external manipulation, has once again brought the Two-Nation Theory into sharp focus. Far from being a relic of the past, it continues to shape realities across borders, binding Pakistan and Bangladesh in a shared historical, ideological, and civilizational struggle.
At its core, the Two-Nation Theory was never a simplistic slogan or a matter of administrative convenience. Its central premise was that Muslims of the subcontinent constituted a distinct political, cultural, and civilizational community, with their own worldview, values, and collective aspirations. To dismiss this idea as “historically lazy” is itself an act of intellectual evasion. Decades after Partition, despite wars, separations, and political upheavals, this premise continues to assert itself in lived realities from Pakistan to Bangladesh, despite repeated attempts to dilute, deny, or suppress it.
Pakistan and Bangladesh are not strangers bound by coincidence; they are siblings shaped by shared history, collective trauma, and resistance against domination. Their separation in 1971 was not the negation of the Two-Nation Theory, as often projected, but the outcome of complex political failures, regional grievances, and most critically, external conspiracy. The role of Indian intervention in exploiting internal contradictions is now increasingly acknowledged, even within Bangladesh. The passage of time has peeled away layers of propaganda, revealing how geopolitical interests were served by weakening Muslim unity rather than disproving the foundational idea that Muslims of the subcontinent form a distinct nationhood.
Language differences between East and West Pakistan were never evidence against shared identity. Islam does not demand linguistic uniformity; it provides a moral and civilizational framework that accommodates diversity. Bengali, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, and Urdu cultures all flourished within the broader Muslim identity of the subcontinent. The tragedy of 1971 highlighted not the failure of shared faith but the dangers of centralised power structures that ignore regional voices and legitimate political demands. To misinterpret this lesson as a rejection of the Two-Nation Theory is to confuse governance failures with civilizational truths.
Today, despite being separate nation-states, Pakistan and Bangladesh remain bound by deep-rooted ties of faith, history, social memory, and people-to-people connections. Brotherhood is not measured by borders alone; it is sustained through common struggles and mutual respect. This growing sense of rediscovery and reconnection deeply unsettles India, particularly under a Hindutva-driven political order that views Muslim solidarity as an existential threat.
India’s discomfort with this reality explains its persistent interference in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. A stable, sovereign Bangladesh that asserts an independent foreign policy, revisits its history without Indian mediation, and reconnects confidently with its Muslim identity directly challenges New Delhi’s carefully constructed narrative that 1971 permanently buried the Two-Nation Theory. For decades, India has sought to portray itself as the ultimate arbiter of South Asian history and morality, positioning Bangladesh as a state whose legitimacy and stability depend on Indian patronage. Any deviation from this script is immediately labelled “instability.”
New Delhi’s strategy has been remarkably consistent, with political engineering, media influence, economic pressure, and selective diplomacy designed to keep Bangladesh confined within a narrow strategic orbit. This carrot-and-stick approach masquerades as regional cooperation but functions as a tool of control. When Bangladesh asserts autonomy, questions Indian intervention, or seeks balanced relations including engagement with Pakistan, it is swiftly subjected to narratives of chaos, extremism, or security risk.
India fears a Bangladesh that refuses to be a junior partner, that engages Pakistan as an equal, and that remembers history without Indian filters. Attempts to influence Bangladesh’s domestic politics and frame internal dissent as security threats are not acts of concern; they are mechanisms of dominance. Sovereignty, in India’s strategic imagination, is acceptable only so long as it aligns with Indian interests.
The growing warmth between Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, visible in public sentiment, intellectual discourse, and civil society, is therefore perceived in New Delhi as a threat. Brotherhood between these two nations disrupts the long-standing effort to keep them alienated from one another. It exposes the fragility of the claim that history permanently divided them and reaffirms the idea that shared faith and experience cannot be erased by political borders.
More alarmingly, allegations of Indian conspiracies and targeted destabilisation efforts within Bangladesh have gained traction. The recent killing of Osman Hadi has been widely cited as a stark indication of hostile designs aimed at creating fear and instability. Such tactics, however, are unlikely to succeed. Bangladesh today is far more aware of its vulnerabilities and far more determined to protect its sovereignty than in the past.
With firm moral and diplomatic support from Pakistan, and with a collective resolve to resist Hindutva interference, both nations are better positioned to counter these pressures. The Two-Nation Theory, far from failing, has demonstrated remarkable resilience. It has evolved from a political argument into a lived bond-one that continues to unite Pakistan and Bangladesh through shared challenges and common purpose.
The Two-Nation Theory was never merely about the creation of a single state; it was about the recognition of a distinct civilizational identity. Pakistan and Bangladesh, despite their separate paths, remain products of the same historical struggle against colonial and majoritarian domination. Their renewed solidarity is not a return to the past, but a reaffirmation of a truth that history has repeatedly tried, and failed, to bury.

The writer is an old Aitchisonian who believes in freedom of expression, a freelance columnist, entrepreneur and social activist.