Zulfiqar Ali Shirazi
Historically, the Arab story has been written against a backdrop of fragmentation: competing empires and mandates, monarchies versus republics, Ba’athists versus Islamists, rich petro-states versus poorer neighbours, and more recently, normalisation tracks that moved at different speeds. This fragmentation eased the path to Israel’s creation in 1948, helped Israel consolidate strategic advantages, and still constrains collective Arab leverage. The reported Israeli strike on Hamas figures in Doha on September 9, 2025, and the long arc of Israel-Iran escalation only underline the cost of division and the urgency for an Arab-dominated Muslim world to chalk out a common strategy.
During and after World War I, Britain and France carved up former Ottoman lands through the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement and the 1917 Balfour Declaration, creating borders and promises that ignored local voices. This fuelled Arab opposition, left Palestinian institutions fragmented under the British Mandate, and sparked debates over whether to resist, negotiate, or fight. In the decades that followed, Arab leaders pursued competing visions such as Pan-Arab unity, separate Syrian or Iraqi nationhood, Hashemite-led “Greater Syria,” or broader Islamic solidarity. Although Nasser’s 1950s-60s Pan-Arabism briefly revived hopes of unity, clashes between state sovereignty and transnational ambitions, monarchies and military regimes, and differing regional and sectarian identities ultimately caused its decline, leaving deep and lasting divisions.
Diplomatically, Pakistan should muster internArab divisions were starkly exposed during the 1947 UN partition and the 1948 war, when poor coordination and mistrust allowed Israel to turn early challenges into diplomatic and military gains. Palestine was left split among Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, fuelling rival claims over Palestinian representation. After the 1967 defeat, Arab leaders struggled to match revolutionary rhetoric with regime survival, and even the 1974 recognition of the PLO deepened competition over who spoke for Palestine. Egypt’s 1978 peace treaty with Israel and Jordan’s 1994 accord ended the strongest collective military front, shifting negotiations and security to separate state-to-state tracks and allowing Israel to redirect resources while Palestinians faced fragmented diplomacy. From 2011, Arab uprisings and civil wars drained regional focus and worsened rivalries, while the 2017-2021 Qatar crisis and subsequent normalisation deals with Israel by the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan weakened the traditional link between Arab-Israeli peace and Palestinian statehood. Even when the Gaza war of 2023 strained these accords, Israel had already secured deeper regional integration and lasting strategic advantages.
The latest Israeli incursion in Doha has highlighted that it can strike in a Gulf capital at the meagre cost of diplomatic pressure alone. The lesson is clear: in the absence of common crisis playbooks, Arab deterrence has eroded. Strikes in Qatar, host to mediation channels previously on Iran and now on Gaza, expose a core vulnerability: a divided Arab world can be outmanoeuvred not only by the US and Israel but also by Iran, as demonstrated by Iran’s missile strikes on Doha in June 2025, both diplomatically and militarily. Pakistan, for its part, has maintained consistent support for Palestinian self-determination through diplomacy and humanitarian relief since 1947, even as regional peace maps kept shifting. Its stated stance has been characterised by no recognition of Israel without a just settlement for Palestinians, repeated votes for Palestinian rights at the United Nations, and a passport inscription that historically excluded travel to Israel (a symbolic marker of its policy). Islamabad has chaired and advanced OIC positions, shepherded resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council, and dispatched large volumes of humanitarian aid to Gaza since 2023. In August 2025, Pakistan’s NDMA marked its 18th and 19th aid consignments, pushing cumulative relief beyond 1,800-1,900 tons. It has reiterated support for a sovereign Palestinian state on pre-1967 lines with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as capital. Pakistan should stay on the diplomatic course and widen it. Its credibility rests on consistency, and, therefore, its role is pivotal.
To reverse the pattern, Arab states and Pakistan can begin by locking in a three-tier Arab consensus and keeping it public. Non-negotiables should include explicit, pre-agreed red lines with a common diplomatic and economic response menu. A joint Arab text can reiterate the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, updated with enforcement tools and timelines, to be tabled at the UN and delivered to all five permanent capitals. A conditional normalisation framework can be jointly formulated, where any new or expanded ties with Israel are contingent on irreversible, verifiable steps toward a Palestinian state, such as a settlement freeze and well-defined end-state parameters with a credible timeline. Piecemeal accords should be paused until these conditions are met. Qatar and Egypt remain central to an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. The Arab League and OIC can jointly designate mediation zones and protocols, backed by Security Council outreach and guarantees from major powers for the protection of mediators in ceasefire talks. All stakeholders must also agree to a shared deterrence-de-escalation ladder, and on proportionate, collective responses to escalations ranging from diplomatic downgrades, travel advisories, and trade reviews to a joint military response. Strengthening Palestinian governing institutions must surface as a priority, to effectively manage Gaza and the West Bank under a UN- and Arab-backed transitional plan. The September 12, 2025, UN resolution could serve as a framework, provided Arab states shape its details and timeline. At the same time, a coordinated communications effort is needed to share accurate information, track humanitarian needs, and counter disinformation.
The recent strategic defence pact signed with Saudi Arabia augurs well for Pakistan, as it provides critical operational outreach and psychological advantage far beyond its own borders. Diplomatically, Pakistan should muster international support against India’s adoption of Israel’s doctrine of preemption and its imposition of water conflict on us. The Arab world should wake up to the fact that restoring leverage requires coordinated red lines, synchronised incentives, and a single escalatory ladder – not twenty-two of them. The more Arab governments pursue divergent priorities, the easier it is to portray Palestinian statehood as a secondary track. Divided, you fall.
The writer is a freelance columnist and can be reached at zulfiqar.shirazi @gmail.com
