Baseer Ali Rahman Khan
In the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, India’s unilateral suspension of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in April 2025 has triggered a new wave of legal and geopolitical debate across South Asia. The decision, described by the Indian government as a response to Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorism, has raised urgent questions about the legal legitimacy of such a move and the technical feasibility of halting river flows into Pakistan.
The IWT, brokered by the World Bank and considered one of the world’s most resilient transboundary water agreements, divides the six-river Indus system between India and Pakistan. While India enjoys full rights over the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej), the Western Rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) are designated for Pakistan, with India allowed only limited non-consumptive use.
Legal Grounds: Weak at Best
India’s action to suspend the treaty — not formally terminate it — appears designed to test the legal boundaries without outright abrogation. New Delhi maintains that the suspension is temporary and justified by a “fundamental change of circumstances” under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. However, experts argue that such claims are tenuous, as the IWT is a water-sharing arrangement, not a security pact.
Critics note that Article XII(4) of the IWT explicitly states the treaty can only be terminated through mutual agreement. The absence of an exit clause renders India’s suspension legally precarious. Any unilateral move may face stiff challenges at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or arbitration forums facilitated by the World Bank, which remains a key intermediary despite its limited enforcement power.
Pakistan, branding the suspension an “act of war,” has already begun diplomatic outreach to international bodies including the UN Security Council. The legal consensus appears to lean against unilateral action, underscoring reputational risks for India, especially as it aspires to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Strategic Blowback and Regional Implications
Beyond legality, India’s maneuver has strategic downsides. Analysts warn that it could embolden China — the upper riparian state on both the Brahmaputra and the Indus — to emulate similar tactics against India. Additionally, India’s water-sharing arrangements with Bangladesh and Nepal could be strained by the precedent.
The diplomatic calculus suggests India is leveraging suspension more as a pressure tactic than a long-term policy shift. Previous threats to revoke the treaty, such as after the 2016 Uri attack, remained rhetorical. The current action, while more assertive, stops short of treaty abrogation — perhaps acknowledging the legal minefield involved.
Chenab River: Technical Limits to Coercion
On the ground, turning off the taps to Pakistan is easier said than done. The Chenab River, critical to Pakistan’s agriculture, flows through steep Himalayan gorges before crossing the border. India’s run-of-the-river projects like Baglihar and Salal offer minimal storage — just 1.2 to 1.3 million acre-feet compared to the Chenab’s annual flow of nearly 99 billion cubic meters.
In May 2025, India temporarily choked Chenab flows by closing sluice gates at Baglihar and Salal under the guise of maintenance, triggering temporary water shortages downstream. However, due to limited storage, India was forced to resume releases within days to avoid damaging its infrastructure. Permanent stoppage would require massive tunnels, new canals, or large dams — investments that would take at least a decade and billions of dollars.
The terrain itself is an adversary. Landslide-prone slopes, seismic activity, and ecological fragility make engineering feats prohibitively risky and slow. Even in flatter regions like Akhnoor, strategic gains are limited due to proximity to Pakistan’s border.
Jhelum, Neelum, and Indus: Less Feasible Still
If halting the Chenab is difficult, the Jhelum, Neelum, and Indus rivers pose even greater challenges. The Jhelum’s course through the densely populated Kashmir Valley and the imposing Pir Panjal range makes any diversion economically and environmentally untenable. While India’s Kishanganga project diverts some Neelum water to the Jhelum via a 23-kilometer tunnel, its storage capacity remains negligible.
The Indus River, originating in Tibet and fed primarily by glacial melt, is the least controllable. No significant Indian infrastructure exists on its main stem, and building large storage facilities in Ladakh’s extreme terrain is widely viewed as impractical. The river’s transboundary source also adds a geopolitical wrinkle, with China potentially retaliating if India attempts manipulation.
Terrain: The Unseen Barrier
The Himalayas, often a symbol of national pride and defence, also serve as an immovable obstacle to India’s water strategy. The steep gradients of the Chenab and Neelum, seismic instability, and the geographical wall of the Pir Panjal collectively make large-scale diversion projects a logistical nightmare. Even where terrain allows construction, the political cost of displacing communities or triggering environmental disasters could derail such efforts.
Conclusion: A Risky Gambit Without Clear Returns
India’s suspension of the IWT is legally dubious, technically constrained, and geopolitically risky. While it sends a strong political signal, it opens the door to international litigation, deteriorating regional trust, and domestic opposition. Current infrastructure allows India to manipulate water flow timing, but not to effectuate stoppage on any meaningful scale.
In the long term, significant investment could expand India’s water leverage — but at great cost and with unpredictable consequences. For now, the Indus Waters Treaty, despite its age and mounting political strains, remains a cornerstone of subcontinental water security. Any reckless move fuelled by Delhi’s miscalculation could land it in serious trouble.
The writer is a BS-19 Officer of Provincial Management Service, Govt of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
