It’s unclear just what role Islamabad can play to bring the Afghan peace process back on track. So far, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi’s efforts, however sincere they might have been, have been rejected by Kabul as interference in Afghanistan’s internal matters. The main problem is President Ghani’s refusal to play along. Just as soon as the Taliban and the US signed on the dotted line, and agreed to a host of conditions leading to a complete ceasefire and subsequent allied (predominantly US) pullout, President Ghani simply refused to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners in exchange for 1,000 Afghan army fighters held hostage by the insurgents. The prisoner exchange was a crucial part of the deal, since it was supposed to set the ground for landmark government-Taliban talks. Intriguingly, after first just ruling out talks, and no doubt facing swift US anger, Ghani has suddenly linked the prisoner release with the Taliban cutting off all ties with Pakistan. Yet how that limits Pakistan’s influence remains to be seen. Ghani, or the Americans for that matter, should realise the role Pakistan played in arranging the whole peace deal; which, of course, came about precisely because of its links with the Taliban. Nobody should also forget that the Taliban have long been the dominant military force on the ground; since 2006 at least. And, since nobody can really tell if the situation after the peace can or cannot get volatile, there might be a real need to maintain some sort of influence over the Taliban in the weeks and months to come. Therefore, President Ghani might be doing himself a great disfavour by venting his frustration on Pakistan.
The Afghan government is no doubt angry at being left out of the whole peace deal. Throughout the talks, the Americans refused to indulge Kabul because the Taliban never recognised the legitimate government – considering them “US puppets”. And since the Americas are desperate for a pullout, because President Trump considers it essential for his reelection later this year, they made all sorts of promises that they just assumed Ghani would accept without any fuss. That, most likely, is why Ghani lashed out at the first chance he got. However, this stalemate is not likely to last too long. Already capitals around the world are making phone calls to Kabul. And, since the Afghan government cannot hope to run without the flow of aid from a number of countries, there’s only so long it can afford its own fit of anger.
