Tariq Khan
When The Economist published its revealing feature “The mystic, the cricketer and the spy: Pakistan’s game of thrones” on November 14, 2025, it sent shockwaves through Pakistan’s political discourse. The article paints a stark picture of how superstition, personal ambition, and military facilitation intertwined during Imran Khan’s tenure from 2018 to 2022, undermining the very principles of governance he had long professed. For a leader who promised a “Naya Pakistan” built on merit, justice, and institutional reform, the reality appears far darker: one in which mysticism and private influence shaped public policy.
According to The Economist, Khan’s political decline coincided with an increasing reliance on Bushra Bibi—not merely as a spiritual adviser, but as a de facto political decision-maker. Reports suggest that Khan sought from her a blend of “spiritual guidance and worldly success,” making her counsel central to matters of state. Rather than grounding decisions in policy expertise or party strategy, the prime minister reportedly gave disproportionate weight to visions, rituals, and predictions, raising questions about his judgment and independence.
The feature details alleged occult-style practices at Bani Gala, described by former staff. Daily demands for beef, black animal heads, and livers, along with rituals in which meat was circled around Khan’s head to remove “evil spirits” connected to his former marriage, underscore a troubling reliance on superstition. While sensational, these reports highlight a pattern in which the personal and mystical intruded into the highest levels of governance in a country confronting economic, security, and environmental crises.
Bushra Bibi’s influence in state affairs is described as “absolute” by a former cabinet member cited in the article. Her interference reportedly extended to postings, policy priorities, and access to Khan, undermining PTI’s narrative of meritocracy and institutional governance. Household staff and drivers recount that even flight schedules and plane departures depended on her approval, turning the prime minister’s official calendar into a pir-driven timetable. The imagery of national decision-making subordinated to private ritual is both striking and alarming.
The report also reveals internal party dynamics fraught with personal loyalty and fear. Jahangir Tareen, a key PTI financier, reportedly raised concerns about alleged black magic by Bushra, only to be marginalized. Loyalists who questioned her influence were discarded, showing how political fates were determined not by performance or party mechanisms, but by whispers and household loyalties. Friends of Khan describe him as naïve, blind to the burdens Bushra brought, and easily swayed by spiritual and institutional actors, despite projecting the image of a strong, decisive leader.
The Economist emphasizes a broader structural contradiction: Khan’s 2018 ascent, widely presented as the triumph of an outsider battling the establishment, was facilitated by the military, particularly the ISI. The article suggests that intelligence elements used pir networks linked to Bushra to feed information to Khan as visions or predictions, effectively creating a double capture of civilian leadership—by both the deep state and a spiritual court. This combination of superstition and institutional manipulation calls into question his independence and decision-making capacity.
The sacking of then-ISI chief Lt Gen Asim Munir is similarly framed. According to the report, his removal followed briefings about alleged corruption involving Bushra Bibi. This move, rather than reflecting principled governance, appears self-protective, with Khan shielding his immediate household while claiming an anti-corruption stance.
Economically, the tenure fell short of Khan’s grand promises. Millions of homes, widespread employment, and a transformed welfare state never materialized. Inflation surged, IMF bailouts came with stringent conditions, and fiscal crises persisted. Khan himself later admitted that such transformation could not be achieved in a single term—a candid acknowledgment, yet one that contradicted the high expectations set by the “Naya Pakistan” rhetoric.
Corruption cases further chipped away at his carefully curated “clean hands” image. Disputes over expensive state gifts and Al-Qadir-style trusts resulted in prison sentences for both Khan and Bushra, directly undermining PTI’s anti-corruption brand. The party itself, according to The Economist, operated less as a modern, institutionalized organization and more around a moral sovereign and his spouse, with decisions dictated by dreams, omens, and personal whims rather than democratic processes.
Violent protests following Khan’s arrest, including attacks on military sites and national monuments, revealed a willingness among PTI supporters to cross institutional red lines, exposing the contradiction between the party’s professed defense of institutions and its actions. Meanwhile, Bushra Bibi, while subject to misogynistic attacks, allegedly exercised enormous unaccountable influence, highlighting a tension between societal prejudice and her real political power.
In the final analysis, The Economist portrays a government where superstition, loyalty, and personal ambition dominated over policy, institutions, and rational governance. Imran Khan, who promised reform and transparency, presided over a state where mystical counsel shaped decisions, military facilitation ensured political ascendancy, and personal loyalty overshadowed merit. For a nation yearning for accountable, rational leadership, the revelations are both damning and cautionary—a reminder that charisma and mysticism cannot substitute for institutional integrity and effective governance.
