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The Yemen Test

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The map of the Middle East is becoming more dangerous by the day. Houthi forces have pushed south along Yemen’s Red Sea coast and, according to the Yemeni government, reached the mouth of the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Across the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia temporarily shut its vital East-West oil pipeline after drone attacks originating from Iraq. With the Strait of Hormuz already severely constricted by the wider US-Iran conflict, pressure is now building around a second artery through which the world’s energy and trade must pass.
Bab al-Mandab carries around seven per cent of global petroleum flows, while disruption there forces shipping away from the Suez route and around Africa at considerable additional cost. The Saudi pipeline itself has recently been moving between four and five million barrels per day precisely because Hormuz can no longer be relied upon. Freight rates are already surging, and Brent settled above $104 on Friday.
Pakistanis are feeling that instability at home. Petrol has risen to Rs375.82 a litre and high-speed diesel to Rs403.32, while the government has been forced into daily fuel pricing because of international volatility.
This is the strategic environment in which the month-old Makkah Joint Defence Agreement faces its first serious test. Pakistan has been correct to leave no ambiguity about Saudi security. Houthi attacks on civilian and economic targets in Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran were condemned in unequivocal terms by the Foreign Office, which reaffirmed Islamabad’s complete solidarity with Riyadh and its right under international law to defend its territory, citizens and national assets. Ambassador Asim Iftikhar Ahmad carried the same message to the UN Security Council while simultaneously calling for de-escalation and a political settlement in Yemen. Therein lies the sensible course. The Makkah accord declares that aggression against one member will be regarded as aggression against all. It was conceived, however, as an instrument of collective deterrence and regional stability. Islamabad therefore need not prove the seriousness of its commitment by rushing into Yemen. Defending Saudi territory, strengthening air and missile defence, sharing intelligence and protecting vital infrastructure are entirely compatible with resisting an open-ended military commitment inside a fractured Yemen. There is room for diplomacy pr ecisely because even states under pressure are exercising some restraint. Riyadh has so far held off retaliation after the pipeline attack at Baghdad’s request, while Washington has reportedly declined Saudi requests for direct strikes on the Houthis, offering intelligence support instead. Pakistan has another advantage. It can speak to Riyadh and Ankara as an ally while retaining channels with Tehran. Those relationships should now be used relentlessly. The Houthis must stop attacks on Saudi territory and commercial shipping; Saudi sovereignty must be respected; and every available diplomatic lever should be used to prevent Yemen from becoming another front in the wider regional war.